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Among the proliferating array of proposals for reforming the doc-
trine of the establishment clause, 1 the "no endorsement" test advo-
cated by Justice O'Connor may seem the most promising.2 Although 
the Supreme Court has not yet accepted O'Connor's proposal in its 
entirety, her essential proposition -that government should not en-
dorse religion - has worked its way into several majority opinions, 3 
portending possible adoption of the "no endorsement" test. To many 
observers, this would evidently be a welcome development; 
O'Connor's proposal has received the praise of numerous scholars 
who believe that a "no endorsement" test could provide doctrinal clar-
ity and consistency, or that the test captures, at least in important 
part, the essential meaning of the establishment clause. 4 
This article will argue that the "no endorsement" proposal does 
indeed represent a significant development - but for a less auspicious 
reason. Far from eliminating the inconsistencies and defects that have 
plagued establishment analysis, the "no endorsement" test would in-
troduce further ambiguities and analytical deficiencies into the doc-
trine. Moreover, the theoretical justifications offered for the test are 
unpersuasive. Despite these drawbacks, the "no endorsement" test ap-
peals to scholars and jurists because it expresses the direction in which 
establishment doctrine and analysis seem to be drifting; the test repre-
sents a culmination of the venerable quest to define a position of gov-
ernmental neutrality - and, recently, of "symbolic" neutrality -
towards religion. Thus, the "no endorsement" proposal is significant 
not only because it may become the law but, perhaps as importantly, 
1. For a recent effort to reduce the numerous competing viewpoints into a manageable set of 
categories, see McConnell, You Can't Tell the Players in Church-State Disputes Without a Score-
card, 10 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POLY. 27 (1987). 
2. Justice O'Connor's proposal is described in detail at notes 21-44 infra and accompanying 
text. 
3. Edwards v. Aguiflard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2578-79 (1987); Witters v. Washington Dept. of 
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 
373, 389 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985). 
4. For citations to academic commentary praising the "no endorsement" test, see note 45 
infra. 
268 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:266 
because it provides a focal point for examining, and criticizing, the 
prevailing doctrinal drift. 
Section I of this article briefly describes the emergence and devel-
opment of the "no endorsement" test.5 Section II then seeks to show 
that the test is deficient as doctrine, and thus incapable of providing 
the clarity and coherence that current doctrine so sorely lacks. Sec-
tion III considers various likely theoretical justifications for the "no 
endorsement" proposal, including the justification advanced by Justice 
O'Connor, and concludes that these justifications, like the test itself, 
are seriously flawed. This conclusion provokes a question: If the "no 
endorsement" test is doctrinally deficient and without theoretical justi-
fication, why has it elicited such widespread enthusiasm? Section IV 
attempts to answer this question by depicting the "no endorsement" 
test as an expression of the long-standing yearning to achieve govern-
mental "neutrality" in matters of religion, and in particular of recent 
proposals which seek to avoid past failures by focusing upon "sym-
bolic" rather than actual or "substantive" neutrality. 
To explain its appeal, however, is not to justify the test. Section V 
of this article shows the futility of attempting to avoid contradiction 
and incoherence by seeking neutrality in symbolism and perceptions. 
The article concludes that the defects of the "no endorsement" test, 
and of the jurisprudence of symbolism, manifest the emptiness of neu-
trality as a guide to church-state relations. The problem is not that the 
concept of neutrality is false, meaningless, or inapplicable to establish-
ment doctrine, but rather that the concept is purely formal and para-
sitic - and thus incapable of generating substantive solutions to 
establishment problems. If the "no endorsement" test ultimately of-
fers cause for hope, therefore, the hope is that the test's deficiencies, 
once perceived, will prompt jurists and scholars to leave behind what 
has proven to be a doctrinal dead end and tum their attention to ex-
ploring more promising avenues that may lead toward an adequate 
establishment doctrine. 
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE "No ENDORSEMENT" TEST 
The Supreme Court's modern efforts to give doctrinal content to 
the establishment clause began in 1947;6 but it was not until 1971 that 
5. Because general descriptive overviews of the Supreme Court's modern establishment cases 
are already abundant, the present essay will forbear to present another such overview. Readers 
desiring useful general reviews of modern religion clause decisions may consult Laycock, A Sur-
vey of Religious Liberty i11 the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409 (1986); L. LEVY, THE EsTAD· 
LISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 121-64 (1986). 
6. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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the Court settled upon the test that dominates current establishment 
doctrine. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 7 the Court declared that in order to 
survive an establishment challenge a law must meet three require-
ments: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; sec-
ond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion ... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion.' "8 
Although the Lemon test has survived for over a decade and a half, 
few have found the formulation satisfactory.9 One frequent criticism 
asserts that decisions under the test have been chaotic;10 commenta-
tors have been irresistibly drawn to "Alice in Wonderland" allu-
sions.II Critics commonly intone what has become an almost 
canonized litany of paired but manifestly inconsistent decisions pur-
porting to apply the test. I2 
In a similar vein, critics - and dissenting Justices - often insist 
that the Court has distorted or misapplied the Lemon test in particular 
cases. Such criticism reached a crescendo following Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 13 in which the Court, ostensibly applying the Lemon test, ap-
proved the use by the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, of a creche in 
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
8. 403 U.S. at 612-13 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 674 
(1970)). 
9. Mark Tushnet notes that "virtually everyone who has thought about the religion clauses 
... finds the Supreme Court's treatment of religion clause issues unsatisfactory." Tushnet, Re-
flections on the Role of Purpose i11 the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 997, 997 (1986). 
10. See, e.g., McCoy & Kurtz, A Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
mellt, 39 VAND. L. REV. 249, 252 (1986) (arguing that on a doctrinal level "the Court's various 
approaches and results are impossible to reconcile"); Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Consti-
tution: A11 Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 311, 315 (1986) (noting the "schizophrenic pattern of decisions"); Cornelius, Church and 
State - The Mandate of the Establishmellt Clause: Wall of Separation or Benign Neutrality?, l 6 
ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 8 (1984) (asserting that observers are "virtually unanimous" in finding estab-
lishment decisions "inconsistent and unprincipled"); cf. L. LEVY, supra note 5, at 128 (establish-
ment decisions "make distinctions that would glaze the minds of medieval scholastics"); 
Laycock, supra note 5, at 450 (arguing that the Lemon test is "so elastic in its application that it 
means everything and nothing"); Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendmellt and 
the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 846, 848 (1984) (establishment decisions 
reflect "incantation of verbal formulae devoid of explanatory value"). 
11. See Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 10 
(1984) (establishment decisions seem "derived from Alice's Adventures in Wonderland"); L. 
LEVY, supra note 5, at 181 (establishment decisions seem to come from "a Humpty Dumpty 
Court" which, as Humpty told Alice, thinks words can mean anything it says they mean); G. 
GOLDBERG, RECONSECRATING AMERICA 75 (1984) (arguing that "Burger's opinion in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman seems to have been written by the Mad Hatter"). 
12. See, e.g .. Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 701-02 (1986); L. 
LEVY, supra note 5, at 128-29, 162-63; Paulsen, supra note 10, at 316; Kurland, supra note 11, at 
10-11; Cornelius, supra note 10, at 6-8. 
13. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
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the city's Christmas display. The reaction to the decision reflects the 
depth of discontent that has accumulated during the tenure of the 
Lemon test. Two decades earlier, Professor Wilbur Katz had sug-
gested that although a publicly sponsored nativity scene offended the 
establishment clause, the offense could be excused under a de minimis 
rationale. "If this means that our neutrality is a bit more neutral to-
ward some than toward others," Katz calmly observed, "a sense of 
humor should enable all of us to accept the situation .... " 14 Contem-
porary critics, by contrast, found nothing humorous in Lynch. Leo 
Pfeffer compared Lynch to the Dred Scott decision. 15 Other commen-
tators found the decision "devastating to first amendment doctrine," 16 
"disingenuous" and "sleazy,"17 "wholly unprincipled and indefen-
sible,"18 and "a paradigmatic disregard of the establishment clause in 
virtually every dimension of its concerns."19 
Like the critics, Justice O'Connor was evidently troubled by the 
Court's reasoning in Lynch. Although joining in the majority opinion, 
she attempted to place the decision on a firmer footing by proposing, 
in a separate opinion, a "clarification" of the Lemon test. Her propo-
sal focuses on the factor of governmental "endorsement" of religion.20 
In O'Connor's approach, the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test 
would mean that government may not act with the intent of endorsing, 
or disapproving of, religion. Lemon's requirement of a primarily secu-
14. W. KATZ, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 23-24 (1964). 
15. L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT 124 (1984). Pfeffer argued 
that both decisions were "predicated upon the same basic concept: the inherent inferiority of 
ethnic groups, either because of color of skin or religious commitment." Id. 
16. Braveman, The Establishment Clause and the Course of Religious Neutrality, 45 Mo. L. 
REV. 352, 353 (1986). 
17. Kurland, supra note 11, at 12-13. 
18. Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by 
Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. I, 8 (1986). 
19. Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall -A Com-
ment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 781. For additional harsh reaction to the 
decision, see, e.g., Dorsen, The United States Supreme Court: Trends and Prospects, 21 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 22 (1986) (Lynch "marked the greatest incursion to date on the separation 
of church and state"); Dorsen & Sims, The Nativity Scene Case: An Error of Judgment, 1985 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 837; Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: Breaking Down the Barriers to Religious Displays, 
71 CORNELL L. REV. 185 (1985). Mark Tushnet concludes that just as compatibility with Brown 
v. Board of Education is a criterion for an acceptable constitutional theory, "a criterion for an 
acceptable theory of the religion clauses is whether that theory explains why the Court's decision 
in Lynch was wrong." Tushnet, supra note 9, at 999 n.4. 
20. O'Connor's choice of the creche case to announce this "endorsement" rationale seems 
ironic; opponents of the decision might well reply that far from rationalizing the result, an "en-
dorsement" analysis in fact identifies precisely what was objectionable in the case. The creche, 
after all, provided little or no material assistance to religion, but it did "endorse" Christianity, or 
at least create perceptions of endorsement. See note 132 infra. Thus, the circumstances of the 
test's own nativity did not bode well for its prospects of rescuing establishment doctrine from 
confusion and incoherence. 
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lar effect would be modified to mean that laws or governmental prac-
tices are invalid if they create a perception that government is 
endorsing or disapproving of religion.21 A law which avoids creating a 
perception of endorsement could be sustained even though "it in fact 
causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of reli-
gion."22 Conversely, a law which appears to endorse religion would 
presumably be unconstitutional even though religion in reality derived 
no significant benefit from the law. 
Justice O'Connor's Lynch opinion offered two justifications for the 
"no endorsement" test. One was practical in character; the "no en-
dorsement" test, O'Connor contended, "clarifies the Lemon test as an 
analytical device."23 The other justification was more theoretical. 
O'Connor started from the fundamental premise that "[t]he Establish-
ment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a reli-
gion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political 
community."24 She then argued that government might transgress 
that prohibition either by "excessive entanglement with religious insti-
tutions" or by endorsing or disapproving of religion. "Endorsement," 
she explained, "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsid-
ers, not full members of the political community, and an accompany-
ing message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of 
the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message."25 
In later cases, Justice O'Connor reaffirmed and elaborated upon 
the "no endorsement" proposal. In Wallace v. Jajfree, 26 the Court 
struck down, for want of a secular legislative purpose, an Alabama 
statute authorizing a moment of silence in public schools for "medita-
tion or voluntary prayer." Concurring, O'Connor again offered her 
"no endorsement" proposal as a "refinement" of the Lemon test, and 
reiterated both the practical and theoretical justifications for that pro-
posal. 27 She agreed that the "moment of silence" law was unconstitu-
21. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor indicated that she 
would also preserve the prohibition against excessive institutional entanglement between govern-
ment and religion, but would not regard political divisiveness as evidence of entanglement. 465 
U.S. at 689. 
22. 465 U.S. at 691-92. 
23. 465 U.S. at 689. 
24. 465 U.S. at 687. 
25. 465 U.S. at 687-88. 
26. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
27. O'Connor again argued that "[t]he endorsement test is useful because of the analytic 
content it gives to the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose and effect." Wallace, 472 
U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She also restated her contention that the establishment 
clause prohibits government from making religion relevant to political standing and that en-
dorsement violates this principle by making nonadherents feel like "outsiders, not full members 
of the political community." 472 U.S. at 69." 
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tional because, in her view, the law had been intended and would be 
perceived_ as an endorsement of prayer, thereby violating both prongs 
of the "no endorsement" test. 28 
O'Connor's Wallace opinion also gave further analytical content to 
the "no endorsement" test. She emphasized that the review of legisla-
tive intent under the test's first prong should be "deferential and lim-
ited."29 She also elaborated upon the "perception" prong; contrary to 
her language in Lynch, which had suggested that the relevant percep-
tions were those of real human beings who are the recipients of 
messages from government,30 O'Connor now made clear that the dis-
positive question is whether the law would be perceived as endorse-
ment by an "objective observer" who is familiar with the text, 
legislative history, and implementation of the law in question.31 In 
addition, the "objective observer" should be understood to be familiar 
with the values recognized in the free exercise clause. 32 This qualifica-
tion represents an attempt to justify limited government accommoda-
tion of religion, and to escape the oft-noted tension between the free 
exercise and establishment clauses. Government sometimes confers 
special privileges upon some persons because of their religious beliefs. 
Some privileges, such as the right to receive unemployment compensa-
tion while refusing for religious reasons to work on Saturdays, may 
even be required by the free exercise clause. 33 If similar privileges are 
denied to nonbelievers, an untutored observer might well perceive the 
conferral of such special privileges as an endorsement of religion and 
thus, under O'Connor's test, as a violation of the establishment clause. 
Justice O'Connor's more sophisticated "objective observer," however, 
would draw no such conclusion, but instead would understand that 
the privilege was intended to further free exercise values.34 
This qualification of the "no endorsement" principle was under-
scored in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 35 a decision striking down 
a Connecticut statute requiring employers to excuse employees from 
28. 472 U.S. at 67, 77-79. 
29. 472 U.S. at 74-75. 
30. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
31. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
32. 472 U.S. at 83. 
33. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commn., 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987); Thomas v. Re· 
view Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
34. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Whether this qualification of the "no 
endorsement" test actually does anything to resolve the conflict between the clauses is questiona· 
ble. If the free exercise clause requires government to confer special privileges upon religious 
believers, then one might conclude that the free exercise clause itself endorses religion and 
thereby offends what, according to O'Connor, is a principal concern of the establishment clause. 
35. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
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work on whatever day of the week employees might regard as their 
Sabbath. Justice O'Connor concurred because she believed that the 
unqualified accommodation required by the statute would be per-
ceived as an endorsement of religion.36 However, she asserted that 
analogous federal accommodation provisions in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 37 requiring employers to make "reasonable" ef-
forts to accommodate employees' religious beliefs, are not unconstitu-
tional. Because the duty to accommodate is not absolute, an 
"objective observer" would perceive Title VII's requirement not as en-
dorsing religion, but merely as furthering free exercise values. 38 
More recently, in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 39 Justice O'Connor again 
enlisted the "objective observer" to justify an accommodation of reli-
gion. The question in Amos was whether amended section 702 of the 
Civil Rights Act,40 which exempts religious organizations from the 
prohibition against employment discrimination, unconstitutionally ad-
vances, or discriminates in favor of, religion. Upholding the exemp-
tion, the Court distinguished between cases in which "the government 
itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence" 
and cases in which government merely "allows churches to advance 
religion."41 The exemption from employment discrimination laws fell 
into the latter category, and was therefore permissible. Justice 
O'Connor found this distinction untenable, but concurred in the judg-
ment on the basis of her "no endorsement" rationale.42 She recog-
nized that the exemption for religious organizations "does have the 
effect of advancing religion," but nonetheless concluded that with re-
spect to nonprofit religious organizations "the objective observer 
should perceive the government action as an accommodation of the 
exercise of religion rather than as a government endorsement of reli-
gion."43 O'Connor implied without actually deciding, however,. that 
the exemption may be invalid if applied to profitmaking religious 
organizations. 44 
36. 472 U.S. at 711 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(l) (1982). 
38. 472 U.S. at 711-12. 
39. 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987). 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1982). 
41. Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2868-69 (emphasis in original). 
42. 107 S. Ct. at 2874-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
43. 107 S. Ct. at 2874-75 (emphasis in original). 
44. 107 S. Ct. at 2875. In terms of her own test, O'Connor's decision to distinguish between 
nonprofit and profitmaking organizations, and to reserve the question of whether profitmaking 
organizations can be exempted, seems questionable. Although Amos involved a nonprofit organi-
zation - the Latter-Day Saints-operated Deseret Gymnasium - the statutory exemption itself 
274 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:266 
Thus, after initially proposing the "no endorsement" test in Lynch, 
Justice O'Connor has continued to advocate and refine the test. Her 
efforts seem to be having an effect. Numerous academic commenta-
tors have written approvingly of the test.45 Lower courts have begun 
is not expressly limited to nonprofit organizations; it extends, without express limitation, to "a 
religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 
(1982). It would seem that an astute "objective observer," charged with determining whether the 
statute communicates a message of endorsement, might consider the statute as written and 
adopted by Congress. Justice O'Connor did not explain why the observer, rather than reading 
the statute, would look only to the statute's effect in a particular case. 
45. Several full-length analyses of Justice O'Connor's proposal, while occasionally doubtful 
about particular aspects of her formulation such as the "objective observer" standard, see note 
106 infra, have been highly favorable toward her approach generally. See Beschle, The Co11sena-
tive as Liberal: The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the Approach of Justice O'Connor, 
62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151 (1987); Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Reli-
gion Under the Establishmem Clause: The U11tapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 
N.C. L. REV. 1049 (1986); Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifi-
cation of the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 465; see also 
Marshall, "We Know It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 495 (1986). 
Other commentators have praised O'Connor's proposal in passing, but with less extensive 
discussion. See Note, Developments in the Law - Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1607, 1647 (1987) (O'Connor's "reformulation properly suggests that establishment clause in-
quiry should focus on the impact of state actions on nonadherents of benefitted creeds, lest the 
state place a 'badge of inferiority' on these citizens because of their beliefs") (quoting Loewy, 
supra, at 1051 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896))) [hereinafter Harvard 
Note]; Note, Permissible Accommodations of Religion: Reconsidering the New York Get Stall/le, 
96 YALE L.J. 1147, 1160 (1987) ("no endorsement" approach "provides a standard capable of 
consistent application and avoids the criticism levelled against the Lemon test"); Dellinger, The 
Sound of Silence: An Epistle on Prayer and the Constitution, 95 YALE L.J. 1631, 1638 (1986) 
(describing O'Connor's proposal as a "promising approach"); Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle 
in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. l, 55 (approving O'Connor's view that avoiding endorse-
ment is "the most important goal"); L. LEVY, supra note 5, at 155-56 (describing O'Connor's 
Wallace concurrence as "splendidly analytical" and an "excellent opinion"); Smith, Now is the 
Time for Reflection: Wallace v. Jaffree and Its Legislative Aftermath, 37 ALA. L. REV. 345, 367 
(1986) (describing O'Connor's Wallace opinion as "thoughtful and candid"); Paulsen, supra 
note 10, at 352 (O'Connor's proposal "has put the best light to date" on Lemon test); Tribe, 
Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sie1•e, 36 H1\STINGS 
L.J. 155, 162 (1984) ("Justice O'Connor at least asked the right question in Lynch. She asked 
whether nonadherents are sent a message by these practices that they are 'outsiders, not full 
members of the political community?' "); Lacey, The Struggle Over Deregulation of Religiously-
Affiliated Institutions: A Classic Internal First Amendment Conflict, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 651-
57 (1984) (arguing for prohibition of "symbolic aid to religion" and quoting O'Connor's proposal 
with approval); cf Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim Abol/f Original 
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 922 (1986) (indicating that government should not be 
allowed "to endorse or prefer one religious faith over others"); McCoy & Kurtz, supra note 10, at 
257 (official endorsement of religion should be a " 'per se' violation of the establishment clause"): 
Lupu, Keeping the Faith: Religion, Equality and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18 CONN. L. 
REV. 739, 746 n.30 (1986) (advocating, consistent with ••no endorsement" idea, elimination of 
"all references to God in public life"); Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creation-
ism": Proposed Standards for Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Sii/dents' Religious Free-
dom, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 333, 373 (1986) (advocating "no endorsement" test for public education 
issues). 
It would be truly miraculous, of course, if all academic commentators were enthusiastic 
about the "no endorsement" proposal; and not all are. See, e.g .. Tushnet, supra note 12, at 711-
12. Moreover, many scholars who approve of the proposal disagree with O'Connor's application 
of the test in particular cases, such as Lynch. See, e.g., Tribe, supra, at 162. 
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to treat the proposed prohibition on endorsement as established law.46 
And Supreme Court majority opinions have invoked the "no endorse-
ment" idea with approval. Recently, in Edwards v. Aguillard, 47 the 
Supreme Court quoted from O'Connor's Lynch concurrence, and in-
validated a Louisiana statute requiring "balanced treatment" of evolu-
tion and creationism in public schools because "the primary purpose 
of the Creationism Act is to endorse a particular religious doctrine."4 8 
These approving references by the Supreme Court do not yet 
amount to outright adoption of the "no endorsement" test. The Court 
seems disposed to accept the expansive implications of the test, and 
thus to employ "endorsement" as an additional ground for finding an 
impermissible purpose or effect in a challenged law. However, the 
Court has not yet accepted the restrictive implications of the test;49 it 
has not confirmed, for instance, that a law which does not endorse 
religion may be upheld even if "it in fact causes, even as a primary 
effect, advancement or inhibition ofreligion."50 And while some opin-
ions, particularly those written by Justice Brennan, refer to endorse-
ment,51 others make no mention of it. Thus, despite O'Connor's 
contention in Amos that the endorsement rationale offers the most 
plausible justification for Title VII's exemption for religious organiza-
tions, the majority opinion, written by Justice White, appears stu-
diously to avoid relying upon, or even alluding to, that rationale. 52 
At present, therefore, the Court treats the "no endorsement" test 
as an occasional supplement to the reigning Lemon test, but not as a 
successor to, or even a definitive refinement of, that test. However, 
46. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1563 
(6th Cir. 1986) (invoking "no endorsement" test to invalidate city's placement of creche), cert. 
de11ied, 107 S. Ct. 421 (1986); Bollenbach v. Board of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987) (ruling that state may not assign only male drivers to school buses transporting Hasidic 
children because this "would undoubtedly be seen as a symbolic union of church and state, 
conveying a message of state support for the Hasidic religion"). 
47. 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). 
48. 107 S. Ct. at 2583. See also Witters v. Washington Dept. ofServs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 
481, 488-89 (1986) (citing O'Connor's Ly11ch concurrence with approval); Grand Rapids School 
Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985) (describing prevention of endorsement as "a core purpose 
of the Establishment Clause," with citation to O'Connor's Ly11ch concurrence); Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 472 U.S. 38, 56 & n.42 (1985) (quoting O'Connor's Ly11ch concurrence with approval). 
49. Thus, in Edwards, Gra11d Rapids School Dist., and Wallace, majority opinions have in-
voked a prohibition against endorsement in holding laws u11co11stitutio11a/. Except for a brief 
allusion to endorsement in Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89, the majority has not used the endorse-
ment rationale, as O'Connor did in Ly11ch and Amos, to uphold a law or practice. 
50. Ly11ch, 465 U.S. at 691-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
51. Brennan wrote the majority opinions in Edwards and Gra11d Rapids School Dist. He also 
employed an endorsement analysis in his dissenting opinion in Ly11ch. 465 U.S. at 701 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). 
52. See Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2867-70. 
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this situation could well be transitional. If dissatisfaction with Lemon 
does not abate - and there is no indication that it will - O'Connor's 
"no endorsement" test seems at the moment to be the heir apparent. 
By offering her proposal as a "clarification" of the Lemon test, 
O'Connor has facilitated a smooth transition to the "no endorsement" 
approach. 
Before its formal acceptance, however, the "no endorsement" test 
deserves more careful scrutiny than it has received thus far. Such 
scrutiny reveals serious problems, both theoretical and practical, with 
O'Connor's proposal. 
II. FLAWED DOCTRINE: ANALYTICAL DEFECTS IN THE "No 
ENDORSEMENT" TEST 
Postponing consideration of the underlying theoretical justifica-
tions offered for the "no endorsement" test, the present section focuses 
upon Justice O'Connor's more practical justification for the test, i.e., 
her contention that the test is valuable because it "clarifies"SJ and 
gives "analytic content"54 to the Lemon test. The "no endorsement" 
test embodies four important doctrinal terms or concepts: endorse-
ment, intent, perception, and religion. The following analysis seeks to 
show that each of those concepts would create serious difficulties in 
application - difficulties that would only serve to aggravate existing 
doctrinal confusion. 
A. Endorsement 
Although the central concept in Justice O'Connor's test - "en-
dorsement" - may at first glance seem straightforward, this appear-
ance is misleading. Endorsement connotes approval; but approval 
may take various forms, and it is far from certain that O'Connor's test 
is intended, or can sensibly be understood, to prohibit all forms of 
governmental approval of religion. Upon examination, therefore, the 
concept of endorsement seems both elusive and elastic. 
1. The Varieties of Religious Endorsement 
Consider, for instance, the following varieties of approval or 
endorsement. 
(1) Historically, proponents of different faiths have often assumed 
that since religions differ in their doctrines, practices, and claims to 
53. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
54. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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divine authority, not all of them could be correct;55 among diverse 
religions, rather, only one could fully enjoy God's favor and approval. 
Thus, disputes have raged over the issue of which religion is true or 
divinely preferred. If government took a position in a sectarian dis-
pute56 by indicating that it accepted a particular religion as the true or 
divinely sanctioned faith, it would thereby endorse or approve that 
religion. This form of approval might be described as "exclusive 
preferment." 
(2) Government might express a judgment that important doc-
trines of a religion are true without indicating that it believes the reli-
gion is exclusively true or divinely preferred. This form of approval 
might be described as an "endorsement of truthfulness." 
(3) Without indicating any view on the truthfulness of religious 
doctrine, government might express a judgment that a religion, or reli-
gion generally, is va1uable or good by suggesting, perhaps, that religiqn 
instills qualities of good citizenship or helps to maintain civil peace. 
(4) Without indicating any view either as to religion's truthfulness 
or as to its value to society generally, government might acknowledge 
that many individual citizens care deeply about religion and that the 
religious concerns of such citizens merit respect and accommodation 
by government. This limited form of implicit approval or support57 
might be described as "accommodation endorsement." 
Though not exhaustive, this list shows that the concept of "en-
dorsement" may be understood in various senses. Intuitively, exclu-
sive preferment seems the strongest form of endorsement and, 
presumably, the form most offensive to Justice O'Connor's test. At 
the other extreme, when one considers endorsements of value or ac-
commodation endorsements, the issue is less clear. Except for her sug-
gestion that some accommodations of religion should be permitted, 58 
however, O'Connor has failed to specify which senses of endorsement 
55. See s. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 476 (1972) 
{describing "willingness of converts [to American sects] to regard anyone who opposed or 
doubted them as perdition-bound"). 
56. See S. MEAD, THE OLD RELIGION IN THE BRAVE NEW WORLD 10 {1977) ("Sectarian-
ism is the claim of a group exclusively to be the church of Christ on earth and the only ark of 
salvation. A sectarian is one who makes this claim for his species, or sub-species, of Christian-
ity.") (emphasis in original). 
57. Supporters of a "no endorsement" test, including Justice O'Connor, sometimes treat ac-
commodation as if it were not a form of endorsement at all. See note 70 infra and accompanying 
text. But since not all citizen concerns are accommodated, accommodation of religion does re-
flect at least limited approval. Cf Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept i11 Co11stitutio11al Law. 72 
CALIF. L. REV. 753, 797 (1984) (observing that "the purpose to accommodate religion is often 
not very different from the purpose to promote religion"). 
58. See text at notes 32-43 supra. 
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fall within her test's prohibition. As currently formulated, therefore, 
the test threatens to aggravate existing doctrinal confusion. 
2. Can the Concept Be Clarified? 
The foregoing criticism seemingly might be deflected by a refine-
ment of the test; proponents might simply specify more precisely 
which forms of endorsement are included in the test's prohibition and 
which, if any, are not. But an examination of alternative constructions 
that might seek to refine the test shows that an attempt to specify the 
meaning of endorsement would create further difficulties. 
a. A blanket prohibition. On the surface, the simplest way to 
achieve clarity would be to insist that all forms of endorsement are 
prohibited. Thus, even governmental actions or messages which rec-
ognize that religion has value, or which attempt to respect and accom-
modate the religious concerns of citizens, would be forbidden. But a 
sweeping prohibition applicable even to governmental accommodation 
of religion would force government to ignore religion and to disregard 
religion's distinctive interests and needs. The only permissible attitude 
for government to take with respect to religion, in other words, would 
be one of studied indifference. At the very least, this construction of 
the test would deviate from the prevailing view that the establishment 
clause does not demand "callous indifference" toward religion. 59 
Moreover, in a polity in which government regularly acknowledges 
and accommodates citizen interests of various sorts, deliberate indif-
ference toward one class of interests may easily shade into, and be-
come indistinguishable from, disapproval60 - which Justice 
O'Connor's test would also forbid. 
If not all kinds of endorsement are to be prohibited, however, then 
proponents of a "no endorsement" test must explain how to distin-
guish between particular forms of endorsement which are permissible 
and other forms which are not. Such a distinction, moreover, should 
not be merely arbitrary; it should be supported by an explanation that 
tells why some but not other kinds of endorsement amount to a consti-
59. Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2868 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). See also 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Intuition tells us that some official 'acknowl· 
edgement' is inevitable in a religious society if government is not to adopt a stilted indifference to 
the religious life of the people."). 
60. Justice Goldberg, while voting to invalidate prayer and Bible reading in public schools, 
long ago noted the possibility that an overly rigid pursuit of neutrality could lead to "a brooding 
and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious." 
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring). Cj 
Cornelius, supra note 10, at 36 (asserting that "government cannot be truly neutral in religious 
matters unless it recognizes and reasonably accommodates the religious traditions and practices 
of our people"). 
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tutional evil. Possible explanations for the "no endorsement" idea will 
be considered later. 61 But the practical difficulty may be noted here: 
Even if a distinction between permissible and impermissible forms of 
endorsement were articulated and justified on a conceptual level, ap-
plication problems of the most vexing sort would nonetheless remain. 
b. Exempting accommodation. Suppose, for instance, that propo-
nents of the test adopt an "accommodation only" construction of the 
test, i.e., one which permits governmental accommodation of religion 
but forbids all other forms of endorsement, including exclusive prefer-
ment and endorsements of truthfulness or value. This qualification 
seems consistent with what Justice O'Connor has suggested concern-
ing the permissibility of accommodation. Unfortunately, the line sepa-
rating accommodation endorsements from endorsements of 
truthfulness or value is so thin as to be virtually invisible. As a result, 
an "accommodation only" construction, in practice, must either col-
lapse back into a fiat ban on all endorsements, or else it must expand 
to permit endorsements of truthfulness and value. 
An "accommodation only" construction implies that legislators 
may adopt measures assisting religion so long as the legislators are 
acting out of concern for the religious convictions of their constituents, 
the citizens of the nation or the state. On the other hand, if legislators 
adopt a similar measure that assists religion because they (the legisla-
tors) believe that religion is true or beneficial, they will probably be 
perceived as making - and, depending upon how the test's "intent" 
prong is understood, may be deemed to have intended62 - an endorse-
ment of truthfulness or value. Such an endorsement would violate the 
"accommodation only" construction of the test. Thus, the constitu-
tionality of a measure helpful to religion would depend upon whether 
the legislators acted - and were perceived as having acted - because 
they believe in religion (in which case the measure would probably be 
considered an invalid endorsement), or because they believe their con-
stituents believe in religion (in which case the measure would be a per-
missible accommodation). 
Beyond creating obvious problems in ascertaining legislative in-
tent, 63 such a construction places inordinate weight upon a supposed 
61. See sections III & IV.A i11fra. 
62. Questions about the meaning of "intent" are considered in section II.B infra. However, 
the Wallace decision constitutes powerful evidence for a conclusion that already seems intuitively 
persuasive: In practice, if legislators known to hold strong religious beliefs pass laws accommo-
dating those religious beliefs and related practices, the legislators will be deemed to have intended 
to endorse religion. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-60 (1985). 
63. The problems inherent in ascertaining legislative intent are considered in section II.B 
i11fra. 
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distinction that may not even be conceptually viable. In a representa-
tive democracy, legislators and citizens are not distinct and separate 
categories of persons. Legislators are themselves citizens, whose own 
interests and beliefs are presumably entitled to be counted. 64 Even 
more importantly, legislators are commonly thought to be capable of 
representing their constituents because they share their constituents' 
beliefs and values. 65 Thus, the legislators' beliefs and the constituents' 
beliefs should often coincide. But if a legislator is viewed in this way 
as a "representative," i.e., as one who can speak for the citizens be-
cause her beliefs and interests are "representative" of theirs, then the 
question of whether the legislator has acted on the basis of her own 
beliefs or those of the citizens seems meaningless: It is precisely by 
acting upon her own beliefs that the legislator "represents" the beliefs 
and interests of her constituents. 
Thus, in attempting to clarify the "no endorsement" test by recog-
nizing an "accommodation only" exception, proponents of the test 
would culminate by making a measure's constitutionality turn upon a 
distinction which may be nonsensical, and which in any event is not a 
distinction that courts can be expected to make with any degree of 
accuracy. 66 Proponents of the "no endorsement" test might try to 
tame this intractable distinction by adopting a "bright line" construc-
tion, either permissive or restrictive, of the accommodation exception. 
Under the permissive construction, laws adopted to accommodate citi-
zens' religious interests and beliefs would be upheld, even though the 
legislators may have shared and approved such interests and beliefs. 
In other words, a genuine purpose of accommodation would serve to 
legitimate laws even though the legislators, in adopting such laws, 
have also approved the truthfulness or value of religious beliefs. Such 
a construction effectively abandons the "accommodation only" ver-
sion of the "no endorsement" test, and offers government a broad Ii-
64. But cf Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1075 (1986) 
(arguing that government officials should not act upon religious reasons in discharging their 
public duties even though other citizens are free to do so). 
65. Conceptions of representation are diverse, but the view that "representation means accu· 
rate resemblance," Pitkin, The Concept of Represe11tatio11, in REPRESENTATION I I (H. Pitkin ed. 
1969), is common and intuitively appealing. Hanna Pitkin explains that this conception of repre· 
sentation is consistent with a position in which "[r]epresentative government is seen as a next· 
best substitute for direct democracy, but a substitute that needs justification. One way to justify 
it is to argue that the representative legislature so closely resembles the whole nation, that its 
actions are the same as what the nation would do." Id. John Adams expressed this view when 
he argued (contrary to the Burkean notion of representatives as trustees, which the conservative 
Adams might be expected to have adopted) that a legislature "should be an exact portrait, in 
miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them." Letter from 
John Adams to John Penn, quoted ill H. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 60 (1967). 
66. Cf Beschle, supra note 45, at I 74 {idea of accommodation "provides no basis for devel· 
oping a clear set of,standards"). 
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cense to support religion under the guise of "accommodation. "67 
At the opposite extreme, under a restrictive construction of the 
accommodation exception, any law which reflects approval of reli-
gious beliefs held by legislators would be deemed invalid, even when 
the law also serves to accommodate the religious beliefs of citizens. 
Under this construction, laws passed by religious legislators would be 
invalidated as impermissible endorsements of religion even though the 
same laws might be upheld if enacted by neutrally agnostic legislators 
conscientiously representing a religious constituency. Thus, religious 
legislators - or, for that matter, anti-religious legislators - would in 
effect be subject to a special disability because of their adherence or 
opposition to religious beliefs. This special disability would signifi-
cantly burden the freedom of belief and expression of legislators - as 
well as penalizing their constituents. 68 In practice, moreover, this con-
struction would be virtually equivalent to a flat ban on accommoda-
tion, 69 and would be subject to the same criticisms. 
These difficulties point to the essential flaw in the "accommodation 
only" construction of the "no endorsement" test: The construction 
tacitly assumes a spurious dichotomy in which "accommodation" and 
"endorsement" are treated as mutually exclusive alternatives. 7° From 
this assumed dichotomy, it follows that if a measure can be viewed as 
an "accommodation" of religion, it is not an "endorsement" of reli-
67. Cf Harvard Note, supra note 45, at 1638 ("The inevitable tendency of accommodation-
ism as it is currently practiced - on an ad hoc, unprincipled basis - is towards religious favorit-
ism, overt or covert, of mainstream religions .... "). 
68. Wallace v. Jajfree illustrates this danger. The decision suggests that laws authorizing a 
moment of silence in public schools - a moment which students may use for reflection or prayer 
- will often be constitutional. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59 (1985) (majority opinion); 472 
U.S. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring); 472 U.S. at 72-73 (O'Connor, J., concurring). However, if 
evidence indicates that the legislators hoped that students would use the moment of silence for 
prayer, then an impermissible intent to endorse will be found. The result makes it difficult to 
escape the conclusion that in such matters the Court has imposed a special disability upon legis-
lators who entertain and express religious beliefs and aspirations, as well as upon the constituents 
of those legislators. Cf Laycock, supra note 18, at 23 ("If ... evidence [of religious motivation] 
renders the Equal Access Act constitutionally suspect, then religious citizens are effectively de-
prived of their right to participate in the political process."). 
69. See McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. Cr. REV. I, 47 ("Legislative his-
tory in an accommodation case is quite likely to reveal that the legislators who cared enough to 
sponsor the legislation were those who approved of the religious practice in question."). 
70. Justice O'Connor does not, and likely would not, expressly assert the validity of such a 
dichotomy. Nonetheless, her discussions of accommodation often make sense only if such a di-
chotomy is presupposed. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2875 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting 
that "the objective observer should perceive the [statutory exemption] ... as an accommodation 
of the exercise of religion rather than as a government endorsement of religion") (emphasis ad-
ded); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 712 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I 
believe an objective observer would perceive [Title VIl's reasonable accommodation require-
ment] ... as an anti-discrimination law rather than an endorsement of religion") (emphasis 
added). 
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gion; thus "endorsement" can serve as a limit upon "accommoda-
tion," and vice versa. But this either/or depiction is badly misleading. 
Far from being mutually exclusive, "accommodation" and "endorse-
ment" of religion are much more likely to coincide.71 Asking whether 
a law beneficial to religion is an "endorsement" or an "accommoda-
tion," therefore, is no more sensible than asking whether a lemon is 
yellow or sour; the answer in each case is, "Both.'' Hence, the concept 
of "accommodation" can provide no coherent or workable limits on 
the kinds of endorsement that are permissible. 72 
c. Exempting endorsements of value. The foregoing analysis sug-
gests the unworkability of a construction of the "no endorsement" test 
which would permit governmental accommodation of religion while 
forbidding exclusive preferment and endorsements of truthfulness or 
value. But similar problems of application would afflict other possible 
constructions of the test. Suppose, for instance, that the "no endorse-
ment" test were construed to permit not only accommodation but also 
endorsements of value, while continuing to prohibit endorsements of 
truthfulness. The dispositive distinction would then be between ap-
proving a faith's truthfulness and merely approving its value; govern-
ment would be permitted to say that religion is "good" but not that 
religion is "true." 
But there is no reliable way for a court to determine whether 
school prayer, or aid to parochial schools, or publicly sponsored nativ-
ity scenes, indicate that the religious ideas or causes they represent are 
"true" or merely that such ideas or causes are "good." Once again, 
the distinction may not even be conceptually coherent: Pragmatist 
philosophy denies the distinction between an idea's value and its truth-
fulness. 73 Thus, a "no endorsement" test which attempted to draw the 
line between endorsements of truthfulness and endorsements of value 
would be conceptually questionable and unmanageable in practice. 
d. Exempting endorsements of truthfulness. The remaining alter-
native would be to prohibit only exclusive preferment, but to permit 
not only accommodation and endorsements of value but also endorse-
71. See McConnell, supra note 69, at 47. 
72. This does not mean that the concept of "accommodation" itself has no value; the courts 
might develop independent restrictions limiting such accommodation. See McConnell, supra note 
69, at 35-37 (suggesting guidelines for permissible accommodation). The point is simply that 
"accommodation" is not useful for limiting the scope of permissible "endorsement," and that the 
idea of "endorsement" is not useful for limiting "accommodation." 
73. William James maintained that "truth is one species of good .... The true is the name of 
whatever proves itself to be good i111he way of belief .... " W. JAMF.S, PRAGMATISM 75-76 (1947) 
(emphasis in original). Thus, James held that "[i]f theological ideas prove to have a value for 
concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, ill the sense of being good for so much." Id. at 73 
(emphasis in original). 
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men ts of truthfulness. Under this construction of the test, government 
could give both material assistance and explicit praise to religion so 
long as it did not express a belief that any particular religion is the 
religion preferred by providence or the state. By contrast to other con-
structions that attempt to distinguish between permissible and imper-
missible forms of endorsement, this construction might well be 
manageable in practice. The problem is that it prohibits too little, and 
is therefore unlikely to appeal to supporters of a ."no endorsement" 
test.74 
In sum, the central concept in Justice O'Connor's test - the con-
cept of "endorsement" - is the source of serious and seemingly irre-
solvable ambiguities.75 The test cannot sensibly be understood to 
prohibit every form of governmental approval of religion. But every 
attempt to refine the test by specifying that only particular kinds of 
endorsement are forbidden results in distinctions that are conceptually 
dubious and practically unworkable. 
B. Intent to Endorse 
Even if the meaning of endorsement could be adequately clarified, 
the question of whether government officials "intend" to endorse reli-
gion would present difficulties. Some of these are difficulties that in-
here in any constitutional "intent" inquiry, while others specially 
affiict the "no endorsement" test. 
74. This narrow construction of the test would reduce its scope even beyond that of the "no 
preference" test favored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by scholars such as Robert Cord. Ac-
cording to "no preference" advocates, the establishment clause forbids two evils: creation of a 
state or national church, and discrimination among religions. See, e.g., Cord, Church-State Sepa-
ration: Restoring the "No Preference" Doctrine of the First Amendment, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POLY. 129 (1986); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). An 
"exclusive preferment" construction of the "no endorsement" test would also forbid the first of 
these evils. But it would not necessarily preclude aid to religion which in fact benefits some 
religions more than others, so long as such aid did not represent that the state regards a particu-
lar religion as the true or divinely preferred church. 
75. The uncertain meaning and scope of "endorsement" are apparent in Professor Arnold 
Loewy's discussion of whether the "no endorsement" test would permit public schools and uni-
versities to let student religious groups conduct activities using campus facilities on the same 
basis as other student groups. Loewy first observes that the question is a difficult one because 
such cases "require the school either to endorse or to disapprove religion." Loewy, supra note 
45, at 1061. One page later, however, Loewy notes that allowing student religious groups to meet 
would be a less objectionable form of endorsement since the school would merely be acting in 
accordance with a neutral "open forum" policy. Id. at 1062. On the following page, Loewy 
concludes that "[m]erely providing a forum has never been thought to endorse the ideas con-
veyed therein." Id. at 1063. Thus, within three pages, Loewy appears to use the concept of "en-
dorsement" in at least two and possibly three different senses, with shifting implications for a 
practice's constitutional validity. The blame for such vagarious usage is not primarily Professor 
Loewy's, but simply reflects the critical ambiguities within the concept of endorsement itself. 
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1. The Standard Problems 
In the past, the Supreme Court has been understandably reluctant 
to authorize judicial inquiries into governmental intent.76 On a purely 
factual level, inquiries into the intent of governmental officials are in-
herently treacherous; indeed, when the governmental body in question 
is a legislature composed of many members with complex and conflict-
ing motives and aims, it is difficult to say whether such an inquiry is 
even meaningful. 77 Moreover, by making intent dispositive of a mea-
sure's constitutionality, the Supreme Court would create powerful in-
centives for government officials to dissemble or disguise their motives. 
Finally, a court undertaking a motive inquiry risks showing disrespect 
for the officials of other bodies or branches of government. 78 
Justice O'Connor's test specifically focuses on the question of in-
tent to endorse,79 and thereby encounters all of the difficulties inherent 
in such an approach. Those difficulties are conspicuous in Wallace v. 
Jaffree, the "moment of silence" case, and in Edwards v. Aguillard, the 
"creationism" case. In Wallace, both the Court and O'Connor con-
cluded that the "moment of silence" statute was intended to endorse 
school prayer. Although that conclusion does not seem implausible, 
the reasons given for the conclusion are nonetheless troubling. The 
majority relied heavily upon two items of evidence: post-enactment 
statements by the sponsor of the "moment of silence" law, State Sena-
tor Donald Holmes, and the context and background of the law.80 
The first kind of evidence attributed to the legislature as a whole an 
intent based upon post hoc statements of a single legislator, thus un-
76. E.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367, 383-85 (1968); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810). Under the 
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, however, the Court does occasionally look to intent in 
determining the constitutionality oflaws or practices. E.g., Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
77. For an insightful discussion of some of the conceptual difficulties, see R. DWORKIN, A 
MATIER OF PRINCIPLE 18-23 (1985). 
78. In many decisions under the Lemon test, the Court has been able to avoid these difficul-
ties by focusing not on intent but on purpose, and by requiring a secular purpose rather thnn 
forbidding a religious purpose. As a result, if a plausible secular reason for a challenged measure 
can be advanced, the Court can avoid probing the psyches of government officials. Thus, in mnny 
cases considering aid to parochial schools, the Court has found a secular purpose with little 
effort. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) ("Under our prior decisions, govern-
mental assistance programs have consistently survived this [secular-purpose] inquiry even when 
they have run afoul of other aspects of the Lemon framework."). 
79. Justice O'Connor talks about both "purpose" and "intent," often seeming to use the 
terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74-75 (1985). The reason for this 
usage lies in O'Connor's view that her test is a "clarification" of the Lemon test, as a result of 
which her arguments may sometimes move back and forth between the original test and her own 
"refinement" of it. As refined, however, "purpose" for O'Connor evidently means "intent." 
80. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-60. 
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derscoring the factual and conceptual problems of ascertaining the in-
tent of a collective body. O'Connor found the use of such evidence 
"particularly troublesome."81 However, she was more impressed by 
the Court's argument that since Alabama law had already established 
a moment of silence for "meditation," the legislature had no conceiva-
ble reason for later authorizing a moment for "meditation or volun-
tary prayer" except to endorse and promote prayer. 82 
But this argument is patently flawed. The later enactment might 
well have been intended, as Justice White pointed out, simply to an-
swer a controversial question not explicitly resolved by the earlier stat-
ute, i.e., to make clear that students could use the moment of silence 
for prayer if they so chose. 83 Moreover, the later statute did not 
merely add the words "or voluntary prayer" to the existing provision; 
unlike the earlier statute, it extended authorization for a moment of 
silence to grades seven through twelve. This extension could have 
been the statute's primary objective, with the words "meditation or 
voluntary prayer" added to clarify a point that the earlier statute had 
failed to address. In an exhibit of consummate illogic, the majority 
dismissed the extension to grades seven through twelve as "of no rele-
vance" because none of the Jaffree children, on whose behalf the ac-
tion challenging the statute had been brought, happened to be in those 
grades. 84 But even if the legislators supporting the statute knew of the 
Jaffree children's existence - an unlikely supposition - the statute 
surely was not enacted for the sole benefit of those three children; 
some Alabama children presumably were enrolled in grades seven 
through twelve, even if the Jaffrees were not. Thus, it was the Court's 
argument, not the statutory extension, that was irrelevant to the issue 
of legislative purpose. 
The problem of disguised legislative intent was not a pressing one 
in Wallace; indeed, Senator Holmes seemingly was penalized not for 
dissembling but for being too candid. But the decision might well sig-
nal legislators in the future to be more cunning in their statements of 
purpose. Justice O'Connor noted this risk, but dismissed it with the 
statement that she had "little doubt that our courts are capable of dis-
tinguishing a sham secular purpose from a sincere one."85 This ex-
pression of confidence is not reassuring, particularly because it 
followed a paragraph in which O'Connor emphasized that the inquiry 
81. 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
82. 472 U.S. at 58-59 (majority opinion); 472 U.S. at 77-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
83. 472 U.S. at 91 (White, J., dissenting). 
84. 472 U.S. at 59. 
85. 472 U.S. at 75 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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into legislative purpose should be "deferential and limited," and that if 
a plausible secular purpose is expressed, "then courts should generally 
defer to that stated intent."86 It is far from clear how a court can be 
expected to distinguish sham purposes from sincere ones when it is 
also required to "defer to ... stated intent.'' 
The dilemma implicit in Justice O'Connor's position regarding def-
erence became apparent in Edwards. Louisiana's "creationism" stat-
ute expressly recited that its purpose was to protect academic 
freedom. 87 Protection of academic freedom is surely a permissible sec-
ular purpose; thus, if the Court had chosen to "defer to that stated 
intent," it presumably would have upheld the statute. Instead, the 
Court, with O'Connor's concurrence, found the stated purpose to be a 
"sham."88 Whether or not this conclusion was correct,89 it under-
scored another problem with "intent" tests: In invalidating a measure 
under such a test, a court cannot avoid expressing disrespect for the 
officials of other branches by attributing unconstitutional motives to 
them. Moreover, if those officials have asserted a proper purpose, as in 
Edwards, a court's conclusion that the stated purpose is a "sham" im-
pugns not only the legislators' motives but also their honesty. As Jus-
tice Scalia pointed out, the implication of the Court's analysis in 
Edwards was that "the members of the Louisiana Legislature know-
ingly violated their oaths [to uphold the Constitution] and then lied 
about it."90 
2. The Special Problems 
Beyond these frequently noted difficulties that inhere in any "in-
tent" inquiry, the "no endorsement" test creates further complications 
because it does not ask simply what government intended,· it asks what 
government intended to communicate. But many governmental meas-
ures may not have been intended to communicate anything at all. 
Sending messages is no doubt an important part of what government 
does; but it is hardly all - or even the most important part - of what 
government does. Indeed, it seems more plausible to think of legisla-
tors and executive officers as wielders of power than as mere senders of 
messages, and thus as primarily concerned with the substantive conse-
quences of their acts rather than with the messages which such acts 
86. 472 U.S. at 74-75. 
87. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:286.2 (West 1982). 
88. Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1987). See generally 107 S. Ct. at 2579-83. 
89. Justice Scalia strenuously contested the Court's analysis on this point. 107 S. Ct. at 2596-
605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
90. 107 S. Ct. at 2592. 
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may happen to communicate.91 Hence, it is possible that measures 
challenged under the establishment clause may have been intended to 
give material assistance to religious interests but not specifically to 
"endorse" religion. The application of O'Connor's "intent" inquiry to 
such measures becomes particularly problematic. 
Consider the following fictitious, off-the-record exchange between 
an opponent of aid to parochial schools and a devout and perfectly 
candid legislator who has sponsored such aid. 
OPPONENT: In sponsoring the parochial school aid bill, did you 
intend to endorse the religion that administers such schools? 
LEGISLATOR: No. If I understand what "endorse" means, and I 
think I do, I'd have to say the answer is "no." 
OPPONENT: But you do belong to the sponsoring religion, don't 
you? 
LEGISLATOR: Yes, I do. 
OPPONENT: And you believe in the teachings and the spiritual au-
thority of that religion, don't you? 
LEGISLATOR: Certainly. 
OPPONENT: And you also believe the religion is beneficial - to 
individuals and to society? 
LEGISLATOR: Yes. 
OPPONENT: Was it on the basis of those beliefs that you supported 
aid to parochial schools? 
LEGISLATOR: Yes, I'd say so. At least, those beliefs influenced 
my decision. I wouldn't support aid to church schools if I didn't think 
their religious influence was beneficial. 
OPPONENT: Then I repeat my original question. In voting for aid, 
you did intend to endorse the sponsoring religion, didn't you? 
LEGISLATOR: I can't honestly say that I did. Now let me be clear 
about this: I'll freely admit that I wanted to help the religion, to assist it. 
But I wasn't trying to endorse it. If you want to know the truth, as a 
legislator I prefer to stay away from publicity on religious issues. 
They're a can of worms, especially in a district like mine where people 
are divided on those issues. To be quite frank, I wish there were some 
91. Justice O'Connor's emphasis upon "messages" rather than material consequences may 
reflect the fact that she is a judge, not a legislator or executive officer. Although Supreme Court 
Justices exercise coercive authority in the relatively few cases which they actually hear and de-
cide, their broader influence lies in the messages they send, through published opinions, to the 
vast number of federal and state judges and other governmental officials, as well as to lawyers 
and the public generally. (Of course, this "message" orientation would naturally be even more 
congenial to legal scholars, who influence public policy, if at all, only through the communica-
tion of messages.) 
A more cynical interpretation might see in O'Connor's emphasis upon "messages" an implicit 
vision of an ineffectual government composed of officials whose primary activity is posturing, and 
whose principal concern is to curry popularity by communicating the right messages. In an 
image-conscious political era, and especially during an administration presided over by a chief 
executive celebrated as a "Great Communicator," this vision of government is, unfortunately, 
not preposterous. Neither, however, is it a constitutionally mandated presupposition for first 
amendment doctrine. 
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way to get the money to the schools without letting anyone know about 
it, like the way Congress funds the CIA; it would arouse less controversy 
that way. But the church schools perform a valuable function; and at 
present they can't operate effectively without state help. That's the rea-
son - the only reason - why I sponsored the bill. 
OPPONENT: But I'm afraid I still don't understand. You say you 
didn't intend to endorse religion. But if you didn't intend to endorse 
religion by sponsoring the bill, then what message could you possibly 
have been trying to communicate? 
LEGISLATOR: I wasn't trying to communicate anything, of course. 
If I'd wanted to communicate, or to endorse something, I wouldn't have 
sponsored a bill. I'd have proposed a resolution, or made a public state-
ment, or written a letter to the editor. Do you think I don't know how to 
communicate when I want to? 
The position reflected in this dialogue is not unrepresentative. To 
be sure, some politicians do seek to attract the votes of religious per-
sons by sending messages endorsing religion. But other supporters of 
governmental assistance to religious interests or institutions may often 
attempt, if only for tactical reasons, to provide such assistance in dis-
guised forms carefully crafted to avoid endorsing religion: The Minne-
sota school aid program, 92 and the preparation of "creation science" 
textbooks carefully cleansed of explicit biblical references,93 may be 
cases in point. In many instances, it would be disingenuous for the 
supporters of such measures to deny that they hope to help, or to ad-
vance, religion. But their concern - and their intent in backing such 
measures - is apparently to extend material assistance to religion, not 
to send messages endorsing religion. Asking whether such measures 
are intended to communicate a message of endorsement seems nonsen-
sical; they are not intended to communicate at all. 
An apologist for the "no endorsement" test might counter this ob-
jection in several ways; but none seems wholly satisfactory. The apol-
ogist might minimize the force of the objection by arguing that nearly 
all laws are intended to be communicative; communication of 
messages is virtually always one intended objective of government ac-
tion, even if there are also other, and perhaps more important, sub-
stantive objectives. But this suggestion, even if correct, raises further 
difficulties. If a measure is intended both to endorse religion and to 
serve objectives other than endorsement, is it invalid under Justice 
O'Connor's test? Although O'Connor has not clearly answered the 
question, there is some indication that she would not invalidate a law 
unless the impermissible intent to endorse predominates.94 If predom-
92. The program is described in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
93. See SCJENTll'IC CREATIONISM {H. Morris ed. 1974). 
94. In Edwards, O'Connor joined in a concurring opinion written by Justice Powell. Powell 
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inant intent is required, the problems of assessing intent are com-
pounded: In addition to the already difficult task of deciding what a 
legislature intended, a court would also have to determine which 
among multiple intents was most influential. On the other hand, the 
"no endorsement" test might be construed to mean that any intent to 
endorse religion (by one legislator? a majority of legislators? a group 
large enough to affect the outcome?) is sufficient to invalidate a law. 
But such a construction is not appealing. It would require invalida-
tion of legitimate measures merely because of tangential transgressions 
of the endorsement prohibition - seemingly a case of the tail wagging 
the dog. 
Alternatively, proponents of a "no endorsement" test might try to 
deflect the foregoing objection by rejecting the distinction between as-
sisting and endorsing; they might insist that an intent to assist religion 
necessarily entails an intent to endorse religion. This tactic, however, 
strains the natural meaning of "endorsement" and thereby deprives 
the "no endorsement" test of whatever contribution it seeks to make. 
In ordinary usage, "endorse" is not synonymous with "assist." I can 
"endorse" a political candidate (perhaps against her wishes) without 
giving her any assistance; my endorsement may be a positive embar-
rassment to her campaign. Or I can give material assistance to the 
candidate (an anonymous contribution, perhaps) without "endorsing" 
her. Even to the extent that their meanings converge, "endorsing" is a 
subset within the more inclusive category of "assisting"; "endorse-
ment" describes a particular kind of assistance. Of course, ordinary 
usage is not sacrosanct; one might simply stipulate that for establish-
ment purposes, all forms of assisting are deemed to constitute endorse-
ments. But what purpose would be served by first identifying 
"endorsement" as the touchstone of constitutionality and then stipu-
lating an artificial definition? If "endorsement" must be understood in 
a way altogether different than the way it is understood in ordinary 
usage, there seems little point in using the term at all. Since Justice 
O'Connor obviously believes the concept of "endorsement" contrib-
utes something valuable to establishment analysis, she presumably 
would not consent to such a sacrifice of meaning. 
Finally, proponents of a "no endorsement" test might concede, 
either explicitly or by construing "intent" to mean "general" or "con-
structive" intent,95 that the "intent" prong of the test has little in-
wrote: "A religious purpose alone is not enough to invalidate an act of a state legislature. The 
religious purpose must predominate." 107 S. Ct. at 2585. 
95. Under such a construction, government would be deemed to "intend" all of the natural 
consequences of its acts, even if it did not specifically desire to achieve such consequences. Cf. 
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dependent relevance to governmental measures not meant to be 
primarily communicative in character, and that such measures must 
stand or fall upon the "perception" prong of the test.96 But this un-
derstanding of the test has drawbacks of its own. In the first place, if 
"endorsement" connotes a communication of approval, why would 
outside observers perceive endorsement in a measure that was not in-
tended to communicate anything? Justice O'Connor suggests an an-
swer to this question by distinguishing between the "subjective" and 
"objective" meanings of a statement. The "subjective" meaning is 
what the speaker intends, and may be determined not only from the 
statement itself, but from other evidence such as context or personal 
examination of the speaker. But many hearers may not have access to 
such extrinsic evidence of intent, and they may thus be forced to ascer-
tain the speaker's intent solely on the basis of the statement itself. 
These hearers may thus apprehend a meaning different than what the 
speaker intended. O'Connor refers to this other meaning as the "ob-
jective" meaning of the statement.97 Applied to measures not intended 
to be communicative, this analysis suggests that outside observers 
might perceive communicative intent in an action even though govern-
ment officials had no such intent. 
On a factual level, O'Connor's analysis is perfectly plausible; citi-
zens may often misperceive what government officials intend. One 
consequence of this analysis, however, is that the validity or invalidity 
of measures intended to assist but not endorse religion becomes wholly 
dependent upon misperceptions; such measures would be struck down 
only if citizens, or an "objective observer," would attribute to govern-
ment officials a communicative intent which they did not in fact have. 
A doctrine which formally adopted misinformation and mispercep-
tions as the standard for determining the constitutionality of a poten-
tially broad array of public measures would seem, to put it mildly, 
anomalous.98 Moreover, whether O'Connor's hypothetical "objective 
observer" could make such a false attribution of communicative intent 
W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF 
TORTS 35 (5th ed. 1984) ("The actor who fires a bullet into a dense crowd may fervently pray 
that the bullet will hit no one, but if the actor knows that it is unavoidable that the bullet will hit 
someone, the actor intends that consequence."). Government would be deemed to have intended 
an endorsement in precisely those instances in which an endorsement would, in the natural 
course, be perceived. See text following note 109 infra. 
96. Justice O'Connor's statement in Wallace that "the secular purpose requirement alone 
may rarely be determinative in striking down a statute," 472 U.S. at 75, suggests that she might 
favor this construction. 
97. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
98. Cf. Greenawalt, supra note 57, at 795 n.166 (suggesting that "mistaken public percep· 
tions ... should not determine the outcome of cases"). 
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seems doubtful. 99 If it could not, then measures intended to assist but 
not endorse religion would simply be immune to establishment review. 
Courts are not likely to embrace such a result, but the effort to avoid it 
would put undue pressure on the already shaky concept of "intent to 
endorse." 
C. Perceptions of Endorsement 
The second prong of Justice O'Connor's test, which forbids laws or 
practices that create a perception that government has endorsed or dis-
approved of religion, generates further analytical problems. By mak-
ing perceptions an independent ground for invalidating a law, the 
second prong raises a critical question: Whose perceptions count?100 
Justice O'Connor has suggested two different answers to that ques-
tion. In Lynch, she implied that the relevant perceptions would be 
those of real human beings - the actual flesh-and-blood citizens of 
Pawtucket, or perhaps of the nation as a whole. 101 This answer, how-
ever, raises insuperable problems. If any citizen's perception that. a 
governmental action endorses or disapproves of religion were sufficient 
to invalidate the action, then the result would be governmental paraly-
sis; religious diversity in this country is sufficiently broad102 to ensure 
that almost anything government does will likely be seen by someone 
as endorsing or disapproving of a religious viewpoint or value. 103 On 
99. See notes 108-09 infra and accompanying text. 
100. Cf Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 592, 611 (1985) (In Lynch, "the Court dispensed at a stroke with what should have been its 
paramount concern: from whose perspective do we answer the question whether an official creche 
effectively tells minority religious groups and nonbelievers that they are heretics, or at least not 
similarly worthy of public endorsement?") (emphasis in original). 
101. 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
102. In addition to the diverse Christian, Judaic, Bahai, and Islamic denominations or faiths, 
the last several decades have witnessed the appearance in this country of a large number of "New 
Religions." See M. MARTY, A NATION OF BEHAVERS 126-57 (1976). More than a decade ago, 
historian Martin Marty offered the following list of "New Religions": "Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Sufism, the Occult, Zen, Baba-lovers, Subud, Transcendental Meditation, Tibetan religion, as-
trology, reincarnation, nature religions, esotericism, drug-associated religion ... Rosicrucians, 
Spiritualism, Theosophy, New Thought .... I Am, Unidentified Flying Objects Cults, Guardjieff 
[sic] Groups, the Prosperos, Scientology, Abilitism, Builders of the Adytum, the Church of 
Light, Neo-Pagan groups, Vedanta Societies, the Self-Realization Fellowship, the International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Nichiren Shoshu, and many subspecies." Id. at 126-27. 
Marty did not claim that his list was exhaustive, and it has doubtless grown longer since 1976. 
103. Recent case law provides evidence for this proposition. For instance, some parents find 
a series of widely used school textbooks offensive to their religion because the books are thought 
to communicate feminist, pacifist, and humanist values. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. 
Schools, 647 F. Supp. 1194, 1199 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). On the other band, many other citizens 
apparently do not find such values offensive, and might well view removal of the challenged 
books from the curriculum as endorsing the religious views of the objectors. Hasidic parents and 
school children object to the assignment of female drivers to school buses, but if the state re-
sponds by assigning only male drivers to those buses, others may see the action as endorsing the 
Hasidic religion. See Bollenbach v. Board of Educ., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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the other hand, to say that the perception must be that of a majority, 
or of some designated group of citizens, seems unacceptable. Such a 
standard, besides creating additional factual questions about what a 
majority perceives, would offend the central principle of Justice 
O'Connor's own test by establishing as definitive, and thereby endors-
ing, the religious viewpoint of a majority or other designated group 
while discounting the religious perspective of minorities or 
outsiders. 104 
The other general kind of answer to the question of whose percep-
tions count would reject the perceptions of actual citizens as a control-
ling standard, and instead would adopt the perceptions of a fictitious, 
judicially created observer. Since Wallace, Justice O'Connor has 
adopted this course. The dispositive question, in her view, is not fac-
tual but legal; the question is whether a law or practice would be per-
ceived as endorsement by a hypothetical "objective observer."105 
However, in avoiding one set of problems, O'Connor encounters 
another. In the first place, a purely fictitious character will perceive 
precisely as much, and only as much, as its author wants it to perceive; 
and there is no empirical touchstone or outside referent upon which a 
critic could rely to show that the author was wrong. The most that 
could be said in a given case is that the "objective observer's" percep-
In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), the plaintiffs asserted that the government's use of Social 
Security numbers in administering welfare programs violated their religious beliefs. Under cur-
rent doctrine, this assertion took the form of a free exercise claim entitling the objectors at most 
to individualized treatment, but if the perception of endorsement or disapproval by any citizen 
were sufficient to indicate an establishment violation, the administration of the program as a 
whole conceivably might be subject to challenge. Finally, sodomy statutes, such as the one up-
held in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), pose an obvious dilemma for an endorse-
ment analysis. Many observers may view such statutes as reflecting and endorsing the view of, 
for instance, Fundamentalist Christians that homosexuality is biblically prohibited and morally 
wrong. Conversely, some Fundamentalist Christians would undoubtedly perceive the repeal or 
invalidation of such statutes as reflecting disapproval or rejection of their religious beliefs. 
104. See Harvard Note, supra note 45, at 1648 ("If the establishment clause is to prohibit 
government from sending the message to religious minorities or nonadherents that the state fa. 
vors certain beliefs and that as nonadherents they are not fully members of the political commu-
nity, its application must turn on the message received by the minority or no11adherent. ") 
(emphasis in original). Cf. Dorsen, The Religion Clauses and Nonbelievers, 27 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 863, 868 (1986) (asserting that the "key objective" of the establishment clause is "to safe-
guard minorities and outsiders with respect to religious beliefs"), 
105. See notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text. This may seem tantamount to saying 
that the dispositive perceptions are those of Supreme Court Justices themselves. But it is un-
likely that Justice O'Connor would actually formulate the test in this way. If perceptions of the 
Supreme Court were adopted as the standard, then in striking down a statute under the "pcrccp· 
ti on" prong of the test, the Court would in essence be saying to the legislature: "Even though we 
do not find (under the first prong) that you illlended to endorse religion, the law you enacted is 
nonetheless invalid because we, the Justices, perceive it as an endorsement of religion." It is hard 
to make sense of such an assertion; if the Justices believe no endorsement was intended, then they 
at least should not perceive the Jaw as an endorsement (although they might recognize that 
someone else would so perceive it). Thus, at least in form, the controlling perceptions must be 
those of someone other than the Supreme Court. 
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tions are remarkably unlike those of most real human beings. But that 
criticism is of doubtful force, because the adoption of a fictitious ob-
server as the standard represents a deliberate decision that the percep-
tions of real human beings should not control. Thus, O'Connor's 
adoption of a fictitious perceiver drains the test's perception prong of 
whatever truly objective content it otherwise might have; 106 and it 
thereby reduces the test's capacity to provide guidance to governmen-
tal officials or to lower courts, as well as the possibility for critical 
evaluation of a court's application of the test. 107 
Furthermore, the adoption of an "objective observer" standard 
logically tends to bring about the collapse of O'Connor's second prong 
into her first prong. Though disembodied, Justice O'Connor's ob-
server hardly operates behind a veil of ignorance. A principal advan-
tage of a fictitious observer, rather, is that its perceptions need not be 
subject to the limitations which afflict mere mortals. 108 Thus, unlike 
most ordinary citizens, the "objective observer" is said to be familiar 
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute 
under review. 109 All of this comes very close to saying that the ob-
server knows the legislators' objectives in adopting the law - or, in 
106. Although generally favorable to the "no endorsement" test, William Marshall finds the 
"objective observer" standard "incomprehensible. Is the objective observer (or average person) a 
religious person, an agnostic, a separationist, a person sharing the predominate religious sensibil-
ity of the community, or one holding a minority view?" Marshall, supra note 45, at 537. Mar-
shall's own attempt to overcome this problem by specifying the appropriate perspectives is 
considered at notes 216-28 infra and accompanying text. 
107. O'Connor's fictitious "objective observer" may seem analogous to the hypothetical "rea-
sonable person" who has served tolerably well as a.standard in tort law. But the "reasonable 
person" standard functions in tort law as an open-ended device for turning over to juries, in the 
guise of issues of fact, questions that cannot and need not be answered in any uniform way. See 
Smith, Rhetoric and Rationality in the Law of Negligence, 69 MINN. L. REV. 27?, 294-303 
(1984). O'Connor envisions no similar function for her "objective observer." She does not want 
the question of perception to be treated as an issue of fact, and she has shown little deference to 
the factual findings of lower court judges on this issue. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2875 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (perception prong raises question of law, not of fact); Lynch, 465 U.S. 
at 693-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (treating perception as question of law and rejecting district 
court's finding that creche was perceived as endorsing Christianity). · 
108. As noted, for instance, O'Connor has suggested that the "objective observer" is pos-
sessed of a good understanding of the nature and scope of the values embodied in the free exer-
cise clause - an understanding which seemingly would surpass anything the Supreme Court or 
academic commentators have thus far achieved. See Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of 
Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 779 (1986) (observing that "free exercise jurisprudence 
... rests on values we have seldom tried to state, much less justify"). 
109. See Amos, 107 S. Ct. at 2874 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). By endowing the "objective observer" with such knowledge, Justice 
O'Connor silently but effectively dissolves the distinction made in Lynch between "s.ubjective"' 
and "objective" meanings. The possibility of an "objective" meaning which diverges from "sub-
jective" meaning was said to arise, after all, precisely because real human beings perceiving gov-
ernment actions often do not have access to such extrinsic evidence of the intended, "subjective" 
meaning. See text at note 97 supra. 
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other words, that the observer knows what the legislators intended. 
Indeed, this conclusion seems inescapable. In applying the test's first 
prong, after all, judges must determine whether legislators intended to 
endorse religion; and surely the "objective observer," who is privy to 
the same information, can ascertain at least as much. Thus, the judge 
who examines the text, background, and implementation of a law and 
concludes that the law was not intended to endorse religion should 
rule that an "objective observer" examining the same factors would 
draw the same conclusion. To rule otherwise would be to confess that 
the judge is not being "objective." 
But if the "objective observer" knows what the legislators in-
tended, then the observer will perceive endorsement in all those in-
stances, and only in those instances, in which the judge believes an 
intent to endorse exists. Of course, the observer might recognize that 
other perceivers - real human beings not blessed with the observer's 
knowledge of text, legislative history, and implementation - will 
sometimes perceive an intent to endorse even when none exists. But 
the perceptions of such other mortal perceivers no longer controls; 
that, after all, is why the "objective observer" was created. To the 
"objective observer," intent and perception will inevitably coincide. 
Thus, the two prongs of the test cease to operate independently, but 
instead dissolve into each other. 
Far from being a flaw in the test, such a reduction, at least if it 
were acknowledged, might seem to be a victory for simplicity. The 
problem is that a focus either upon legislative intent or upon the ficti-
tious perceptions of a disembodied observer diverges from the purpose 
which Justice O'Connor attributes to the "no endorsement" test. As 
noted, O'Connor has explained that the "no endorsement" test seeks 
to prevent government from sending messages which lead some citi-
zens to believe that they are "outsiders" because of their religious be-
liefs.110 If that is the purpose of the test, however, then the pertinent 
fact controlling the application of the test should be neither the per-
haps indiscernible intent of government officials nor the imagined per-
ceptions of a fictitious observer; the controlling standard, rather, 
should be the actual perceptions of real citizens. If citizens in fact 
perceive that government is endorsing or disapproving of religion, 
then they may feel like "outsiders," even though the legislators in-
tended no such consequence (and even though a hypothetical "objec-
tive observer" would suffer no similar sense of exclusion). Conversely, 
if citizens do not in fact perceive an endorsement of religion, then they 
110. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-88 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
November 1987] The "No Endorsement" Test 295 
are not made to feel like "outsiders" because of their religion regard-
less of what legislators may have intended, or what an "objective ob-
server" might perceive. Thus, the content of Justice O'Connor's test 
does not correspond to its ostensible purpose. 
Hence, there seems to be no satisfactory response to the question of 
whose perception should count. One may attempt to answer that 
question either by enthroning the perceptions of actual citizens or by 
constructing an artificial perceiver, as O'Connor does; but either re-
sponse generates serious practical and theoretical problems of its own. 
D. Religion 
Although the difficulty of defining "religion" is hardly unique to 
the "no endorsement" test, the test threatens to aggravate the diffi-
culty. Both the Lemon test and the establishment clause itself use the 
term "religion," and one might therefore suppose that courts could 
not decide establishment cases without first defining what "religion" 
means. But the Supreme Court has in fact had little to say on the 
subject. 111 By contrast to many legal questions that are answerable 
conceptually but difficult to resolve in practice, the question of what 
"religion" means is daunting on a conceptual level, 112 but has posed 
remarkably few problems in actual cases. It is necessary to consider 
how this fortunate state of affairs has come to exist and whether adop-
tion of a "no endorsement" test would alter it. 
r. De.fining ''Religion" Under Existing Doctrine 
Although the definition of religion has rarely been troublesome in 
establishment cases, 113 the question has created greater difficulty in 
free exercise cases. 114 The more frequent occurrence in free exercise 
111. The Court's limited pronouncements on the meaning of religion are discussed in Green-
awalt, supra note 57, at 759-61. 
112. The vast diversity of religions and religious beliefs, see note 102 supra, has led scholars 
to doubt the possibility of formulating any satisfactory definition of "religion"; some scholars 
have urged the Court not to attempt the task. Phillip Johnson asserts that "[t]he fact is that no 
definition of religion for constitutional purposes exists, and no satisfactory definition is likely to 
be conceived." Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendme/lt Religious Doctrine, 72 
CALIF. L. REV. 817, 832 (1984). See also Freeman, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional 
Definition of ''Religion," 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1548 (1983) (suggesting that the question be an-
swered by looking for "family resemblances" rather than by declaring a definition); Greenawalt, 
supra note 57, at 762-76 (advocating an analogical rather than definitional approach). 
113. In most cases, the religious nature of the institution or interest at issue has not been 
controversial. But cj Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979) (concluding after lengthy 
analysis that Transcendental Meditation is religion under the establishment clause). 
114. For instance, in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), the Supreme Court strug-
gled with the question of whether an ethical objection to war could be considered "religious." 
Although the majority treated the question as one of statutory construction, Justice Harlan 
pointed out that the construction was severely strained and concurred on free exercise grounds. 
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cases of disputes about what counts as "religion" seems to result from 
two differences between the clauses: viewpoint and standing.11 5 
a. Viewpoint. Some citizens may consider a particular institution 
or interest to· be religious even though government officials do not. 
The question of viewpoint asks whose perspective should control. 
Although the issue is seldom addressed explicitly, establishment deci-
sions tacitly adopt the viewpoint of the government. 116 The free exer-
cise clause, by contrast, focuses upon the individual's perspective. If 
free exercise is designed to safeguard conscience, or to spare individu-
als the painful choice of either breaking the law or violating their reli-
gious duty, it makes no sense to adopt government's view of what 
conscience 'and religious duty demand; the individual's perspective 
must provide the standard.117 
The choice of viewpoint, of course, does not supply a definition 
telling what "religion" means, ·bl!t the choice strongly influences the 
frequency with which that question is thrust upon the courts. There 
are certain institutions, practices, and beliefs - the Catholic Church, 
prayer, and the Apostles' Creed, to mention some obvious examples -
398 U.S. at 344-67 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Africa v. Commonwealth, 662 F.2d 1025, 
1034 (3d Cir. 1981) (rejecting claim that MOVE, described as a "revolutionary" organization 
"absolutely opposed to all that is wrong," is a religion); Founding Church of Scientology v. 
United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969) (ruling after consider-
able discussion that Hubbard Electrometers, or "E-Meters," are part of religious practice); 
United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 444-45 (D.D.C. 1968) (rejecting claim that Neo-Ameri-
can Church, devoted to drug use, is a genuine religion); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 
P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (ruling that use of peyote is bona fide religious practice of 
Native American Church); Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 153 Cal. App. 2d 
673, 315 P.2d 394 (1957) (concluding after lengthy analysis that Fellowship of Humanity is 
religion despite lack of belief in Supreme Being). 
115. Some commentators might account for the difference by arguing that "religion" has -
or should have - a broader meaning in free exercise cases, so that courts must decide more 
frequently whether borderline cases involve "religion." See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 826-33 (1978); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 1056 (1978). However, the Supreme Court has not thus far accepted the proposition that 
"religion" should be given different definitions in the establishment and free exercise clauses. 
116. This choice of viewpoint is evident in decisions which, after attributing a legitimate 
secular objective to government, uphold a practice or law even though the law's objective would 
be viewed as religious by some people. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980) (re-
jecting establishment challenge to law restricting abortion funding); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing law). If the establishment clause is viewed primarily 
as a prohibition forbidding improper exercises of governmental power, rather than as a shield 
protecting individual rights, then government's vision of what it is trying to do seems to be the 
relevant perspective. 
117. Professor Laurence Tribe asserts that "when free exercise issues are raised, religious 
claims are to be examined not in terms of the majority's concept of religion but in terms of the 
social function of the group, or in terms of the role the beliefs assume in the individual's life." L. 
TRIBE, supra note 115, at 831. But cf Be Vier, The Free Exercise Clause: A View From the Public 
Forum. 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 963, 973 (1986) (tentatively suggesting that it would be prefer-
able to "look[] at the free exercise clause principally as a constraint on lawmaking power instead 
of principally as a guarantor of a certain quantum of individual liberty"). 
November 1987] The ''No Endorsement" Test 297 
which nearly everyone would regard as religious; and there are other 
institutions, practices, and beliefs - for example, the Aryan Nations 
Church, Transcendental Meditation, and ethical objection to military 
service - which are controversial or borderline cases. To the extent 
that litigation affects institutions or interests which nearly everyone 
regards as religious, borderline cases and the problem of definition 
need not be addressed. The adoption of the government's viewpoint in 
establishment cases takes advantage of such areas of consensus, be-
cause government's views regarding what is "religious" and what is 
"secular" are likely to correspond to conventional views held by peo-
ple in the community. Thus, government and most citizens are likely 
to agree that parochial schools have a "religious" component, and that 
increasing economic prosperity is a "secular" objective. Some people 
may see such matters differently, but there is generally no need, under 
current establishment doctrine, to grapple with unorthodox 
viewpoints. 
Conversely, by adopting the viewpoint of individuals objecting to 
government practices, free exercise decisions are more likely to bring 
unconventional perspectives to the forefront. There is no general con-
sensus that the taking of hallucinogenic drugs, 118 or the use of "Hub-
bard Electrometers,"119 are religious exercises; but some people believe 
they are, and the believers' perspective is critical in free exercise cases. 
Such cases are thus more likely to involve courts in exploring the 
boundaries of what can be considered "religion." 
b. Standing. A second difference between the establishment and 
free exercise cases concerns the kind of injury needed to confer stand-
ing to sue. The Supreme Court has ruled that mere awareness of a 
constitutional violation does not qualify as such an injury; 120 and this 
limitation may pose problems for prospective plaintiffs seeking to as-
sert establishment challenges. The principal kind of evil against which 
the establishment clause protects is institutional, not individual. Gov-
ernmental action violating the clause generally involves some form of 
support for religion. But the religion so benefited is not injured, and in 
any event is unlikely to complain about such support; and nonadher-
ents to the religion may be hard pressed to show any concrete injury 
which they personally have suffered. Aware of this difficulty, the 
courts have in some instances relaxed standing requirements - by al-
lowing taxpayer standing, for instance - to permit establishment 
118. See People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964). 
119. See Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969). 
120. See, e.g .. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
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challenges that otherwise might never reach the courts. 121 Recently, 
however, the Supreme Court has been little inclined to grant such in-
dulgences.122 As a result, persons holding borderline or idiosyncratic 
views of "religion" may be unable to challenge government practices 
on establishment grounds. 
Conversely, if such persons are not merely offended by govern-
ment's support for what they regard as religion, but are actually inhib-
ited in exercising their own religious beliefs, they will likely have 
standing to complain on free exercise grounds. 123 Inhibition in the 
exercise of one's religion is precisely the kind of injury that the free 
exercise clause is designed to prevent. 124 By so defining the nature of 
the cognizable injury, therefore, free exercise doctrine is more likely to 
confer standing upon persons who hold unconventional views of what 
is "religion," and who may therefore force the definitional issue upon 
the courts. 
These differences in viewpoint and standing help to explain why 
the Supreme Court has been able largely to avoid the problem of defin-
ing religion in establishment cases. One might wisely hope that this 
situation will continue. Fashioning a general definition of religion 
seems virtually impossible; 125 thus, forcing courts to address the defi-
nitional issue would almost certainly add one more source of confu-
sion to establishment doctrine.126 
121. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (permitting challenge to parochial school 
aid on basis of taxpayer standing). 
122. E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (distinguishing F/ast, and denying taxpayer and citizen standing in 
establishment clause case); see also Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 
(1986) (rejecting board member's standing in individual, official, and parental capacities to ap-
peal from lower court decision requiring school to permit student prayer club to meet during 
activity periods). 
123. In theory, inhibition of religion may also implicate the establishment clause. But 
although the Lemon test purports to forbid measures whose principal effect either advances or 
inhibits religion, Professor Laycock points out that the "inhibition" provision of Lemo11 is analyt-
ically out of place, and that the Court has never applied it in an actual holding. Laycock, To-
wards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relatio11s a11d the 
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1380-85 (1981). 
124. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981). 
125. See note 112 supra. 
126. It might seem that there is little point in avoiding definitional questions in establishment 
cases if the same questions will still have to be addressed in free exercise cases. But the conse-
quences of answering such questions in free exercise cases is often less far-reaching. Unlike es-
tablishment challenges, which if successful may lead to the general invalidation of a law or the 
general elimination of a practice, free exercise cases usually involve claims for a special exemp-
tion from a law or regulation. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (denying 
exemption from military dress code); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting exemp-
tion from compulsory education requirement). See generally Stone, Constitutio11ally Compelled 
Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 985 (1986). Because in a 
free exercise case no general invalidation is sought, no general definition of religion is required; it 
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2. Defining ''Religion" Under the "No Endorsement" Test 
Adoption of a "no endorsement" test, however, is likely to have 
just that effect. The test would introduce the free exercise features of 
viewpoint and standing into establishment doctrine, thereby multiply-
ing the occasions in which courts may become embroiled in trouble-
some definitional issues. 
a. Viewpoint. The "no endorsement" test, by mandating invali-
dation of laws creating a "perception" that government has endorsed 
religion, introduces a nongovernmental viewpoint into establishment 
doctrine. In incorporating outsiders' perceptions that religion is being 
endorsed, the test also incorporates outsiders' conceptions of what 
"religion" is. Thus, a challenged law would have to survive tests em-
ploying both the governmental viewpoint (under the "intent" prong) 
and a nongovernmental viewpoint (under the "perception" prong). 
To be sure, the test's nongovernmental viewpoint might not in-
clude the perspectives of persons holding unconventional or idiosyn-
cratic views of religion, since their perspectives might not correspond 
to those of Justice O'Connor's "objective observer." Still, in ruling 
that an "objective observer" would not regard the object of a particu7 
lar governmental endorsement as religious, a judge would likely be 
confronted with the argument that some members of the community 
do regard the object as religious. And in responding to that argument, 
a responsible judge would inevitably be forced to explain the reasons 
why he, or the "objective observer," declined to adopt those citizens' 
conception of "religion."127 Thus, even if the "no endorsement" test's 
perception prong does not actually encompass unconventional views 
held by members of the community, it would force courts to respond 
to those views, and thus to become involved in definitional issues 
about religion. 
b. Standing. Justice O'Connor has not expressly addressed the 
question of standing under her proposed test, but the logic of her pro-
posal prescribes a much broader eligibility to sue. Under existing es-
tablishment doctrine, the evil to be prevented is improper 
governmental support for, or entanglement with, religion. Thus, the 
clause is primarily concerned with maintaining proper institutional re-
lations. O'Connor's analysis, by contrast, reconceives the purpose of 
the establishment clause as individual rather than institutional. Her 
is enough to decide that the particular plaintiff sincerely regards an interest or belief as religious. 
Establishment decisions are not so easily limited. 
127. This problem is implicit in Lynch; it does not become conspicuous there simply because 
Justice O'Connor's opinion makes scant effort to confront directly, or to show the errors of, the 
views of Jews and others who see the creche as a religious symbol. See note 132 infra. 
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proposal aims to prevent government from sending messages which 
make some citizens feel like "outsiders" because of their nonadherence 
to particular religious beliefs. 128 A person who perceives that a law 
endorses a religious belief which he does not accept, and who thus 
feels like an "outsider," has suffered precisely the kind of injury that 
the establishment clause, in O'Connor's view, is designed to prevent; 
and he should therefore have standing to challenge the law. 
Indeed, the logic of O'Connor's position would exceed free exercise 
doctrine in conferring standing to sue. Under the free exercise clause, 
a plaintiff generally must show that the law or practice in question 
imposes a "substantial" or "severe" burden on the exercise of her reli-
gion.129 But if the evil prevented by the establishment clause is the 
sending of messages which make citizens feel like "outsiders," as 
O'Connor contends, an establishment clause plaintiff logically should 
not be required to allege a "substantial" or "severe" burden on the 
exercise of his religion. It should be sufficient, rather, to assert that he 
feels like an "outsider" because of some governmental message touch-
ing upon religion. 
Thus, the conception of injury embodied in Justice O'Connor's test 
offers an expansive license for dissatisfied citizens holding unconven-
tional views of religion to challenge government policy on religious 
grounds. In doing so, her conception also increases the likelihood that 
courts will be forced to struggle with definitional questions about what 
"religion" means. Such a development is not calculated to improve 
the clarity and consistency of establishment jurisprudence. 
E. The Fruits of Incoherence 
The foregoing analysis has suggested that the "no endorsement" 
approach is riven by ambiguities and analytical flaws. These problems 
in the approach are not merely academic; their effect is to render the 
"no endorsement" test ineffectual as a doctrinal tool. Because the test 
is composed of unmanageable or fatally ambiguous concepts, it cannot 
provide the needed predictability or guidance for lower courts and 
other government officials. Although the Court has not actually 
adopted the "no endorsement" test, a comparison of the analyses of 
particular controversies advocated by Justice O'Connor and by others 
128. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
129. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (striking down Indiana law 
which denied unemployment compensation to Jehovah's Witness who refused to work in arms 
factory because law put "substantial pressure on an adherent ... to violate his beliefs"): Wiscon· 
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (noting, in exempting Amish from compulsory school 
attendance, that "[t]he impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents' practice of the 
Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable"). 
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who also favor a "no endorsement" approach demonstrates that the 
"no endorsement" test would not provide clarity or predictability to 
establishment jurisprudence. 
Lynch itself supports this criticism. Justice Brennan argued in dis-
sent that a city's inclusion of a creche in a publicly sponsored Christ-
mas display constitutes an endorsement of Christianity. 130 
Commentators have generally agreed. 131 To the extent that empirical 
evidence has any bearing upon the question, the evidence would seem 
to support the argument of the qissent: At least some citizens evi-
dently perceived the city's inclusion of a creche in the Christmas dis-
play as an objectionable endorsement of religion. 132 Nonetheless, 
Justice O'Connor, the test's author, concluded that the city's use of the 
creche reflected no intent to endorse Christianity and would not create 
perceptions of such endorsement. 
Further evidence of the test's indeterminate character appears in a 
recent article written by Professor Arnold Loewy. Loewy likes the "no 
endorsement" test. 133 In applying that test to particular controversies, 
however, he concludes that Pawtucket's sponsorship of a nativity 
scene violated the establishment clause, 134 that Alabama's "moment of 
silence" law probably did not violate the clause, 135 and that ceremonial 
invocations of deity, such as those occurring in the Pledge of Alle-
giance or the opening of a Supreme Court session, do violate the "no 
endorsement" test. 136 In each instance, Justice O'Connor would dis-
agree.137 Thus, Professor Loewy and Justice O'Connor, while pur-
porting to apply the same test, would regularly reach precisely 
opposite conclusions in a wide range of controversies. Such disparate 
conclusions underscore the analytical deficiencies which destroy the 
test's usefulness as a practical doctrinal tool. 
130. 465 U.S. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
131. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 100, at 611; Loewy, supra note 45, at 1065. 
132. The plaintiffs in the case all perceived the creche "as demonstrating the City's support 
for the Christian religion." Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1157 (D.R.!. 1981), affd., 691 
F.2d 1029 (!st Cir. 1982), revd., 465 U.S. 668 (1984). More generally, Justice O'Connor's con-
clusion that the creche did not endorse religion "came as a surprise to most Jews." Tushnet, 
supra note 12, at 712 n.52. Leo Pfeffer asserts that the creche was offensive not only to Jews but 
also to the National Council of Churches, Baptists, Unitarians, and to "Ethical Culturalists, and 
secularists." L. PFEFFER, supra note 15, at 120. 
133. Loewy, supra note 45, at 1050-51. 
134. Id. at 1065. 
135. Id. at 1068. 
136. Id. at 1055-58. 
137. O'Connor concurred, as described above, in the results in the creche and moment of 
silence cases. She has indicated that ceremonial invocations of deity on coins and in the opening 
of a Supreme Court session are permissible. Lynch. 465 U.S. at 693. 
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Ill. DEFECTIVE THEORY: INADEQUATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE 
"No ENDORSEMENT" PRINCIPLE 
The foregoing analysis suggests that the "no endorsement" test is 
unlikely to improve upon Lemon as a formulation of workable doc-
trine. But courts and lawyers are all too used to working with imper-
fect doctrine; thus, the doctrinal shortcomings of the "no 
endorsement" test might be excused if powerful theoretical justifica-
tions for the test could be produced. This section analyzes several 
likely justifications for a "no endorsement" principle, including the 
theoretical rationale proposed by Justice O'Connor. The section con-
cludes that far from providing grounds for indulging the test's practi-
cal flaws, the justifications are themselves vitiated by analytical defects 
that cast further doubt on the "no endorsement" proposal. 
A. Is the ''No Endorsement" Principle Self-Evident? 
The analysis in this section asks whether the central proposition 
contained in Justice O'Connor's proposal, i.e., the proposition that 
government should be constitutionally precluded from endorsing or 
disapproving of religion, can be justified. To some, however, that cen-
tral proposition may seem axiomatic or self-evident - and thus 
neither in need of nor susceptible of further justification.138 But this 
position is unpersuasive. Governmental endorsement of religion has a 
long history in this country. From the Continental Congress139 
through the framing of the Bill of Rights140 and on down to the pres-
ent day, government and government officials - including Presidents 
George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and, of course, Ronald Rea-
gan, not to mention the Supreme Court itself 141 - have frequently 
expressed approval of religion and religious ideas.142 Such history 
may not prove that governmental approval of religion is constitution-
138. See, e.g., McCoy & Kurtz, supra note 10, at 257 (asserting without supporting justifica· 
tion that endorsement is a "per se" violation of the establishment clause). 
139. Thomas Curry notes, for instance, that the Continental Congress "sprinkled its proceed-
ings liberally with the mention of God, Jesus Christ, the Christian religion, and many other 
religious references." T. CURRY, THE Frnsr FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO 
THE PASSAGE OF THE Frnsr AMENDMENT 217 (1986). 
140. Shortly after approving the Bill of Rights, which of course included the establishment 
clause, the first Congress resolved to observe a day of thanksgiving and prayer in appreciation of 
"the many signal favors of Almighty God." Id. 
141. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose 
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 
U.S. 457, 471 (1892) (asserting that "this is a Christian nation"). 
142. See generally Note, Civil Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237 
(1986). 
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ally proper. 143 But the history at least demonstrates that many Ameri-
cans, including some of our early eminent statesmen, have believed 
such approval was proper. That fact alone is sufficient to show that 
the "no endorsement" principle is controversial, not easily self-
evident. 
Indeed, far from being self-evident, the "no endorsement" princi-
ple when viewed in context seems positively counterintuitive. Despite 
occasional calls for "strict separation" or "strict neutrality," virtually 
everyone concedes that some beneficial interactions between govern-
ment and religion are allowable; even the self-professed absolutists 
who dissented in Everson v. Board of Education agreed that the state 
should at least extend police and fire protection to churches. 144 Thus, 
the critical question asks what criteria should be used to distinguish 
between those beneficial interactions that are permissible and those 
that are impermissible. Many establishment decisions have focused on 
the kind or extent of actual material benefit conferred on religion: 
Does the law at issue "have as a principal or primary effect the ad-
vancement or inhibition of religion?" 145 By contrast, Justice 
O'Connor's test discards actual material benefit as the governing crite-. 
rion and instead looks primarily to the message that a law conveys. It 
is natural, and only partially misleading, to conclude that "O'Connor 
seems to be saying that appearance supercedes reality." 146 
Viewed in this way, however, the "no endorsement" principle is 
not axiomatic. On the contrary, it would hardly seem implausible to 
suggest that O'Connor has things exactly backwards: Government 
should not bestow actual benefits upon religion, it might be argued, 
but "mere" endorsement of religion is thoroughly in keeping with our 
traditions. Thus, proponents of a "no endorsement" approach to the 
establishment clause cannot rest on the assumption that their position 
is self-evident; they must be prepared to argue for it. 147 
143. Cf. Laycock, supra note 45, at 913 ("The argument cannot be merely that anything the 
Framers did is constitutional. ... Of course the state and federal establishment clauses did not 
abruptly end all customs in tension with their implications. No innovation ever does."). 
144. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 60-61 (1947) (Rutledge, J., joined by Frank-
furter, Jackson, and Burton, JJ., dissenting). 
145. This inquiry constitutes the second prong of the Lemon test and has thus been used in 
hundreds of decisions. 
146. Gibney, State Aid to Religious-Affiliated Schools: A Political Analysis, 28 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 119, 144 n.164 (1986). The conclusion is partially misleading because appearances and 
symbols are part of, and not simply images of, the overall reality in which citizens live. 
147. In unguarded moments, even Justice O'Connor herself seems instinctively to reject her 
own approach. Perhaps the clearest test cases for the "no endorsement" proposal would be 
instances in which government verbally endorses, but gives no material assistance to, religion. 
Purely ceremonial public references to deity or religion seem to present such test cases, and in 
those cases O'Connor finds no constitutional infirmity. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., 
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B. The Divisiveness Argument 
A second theoretical justification might assert that a "no endorse-
ment" principle serves to prevent division along religious lines. 148 Jus-
tices and scholars have divided over whether prevention of religious 
division should be a governing policy in establishment analysis. 149 
Even if potential divisiveness is a proper and substantial constitutional 
concern, however, the connection between that concern and a "no en-
dorsement" principle is tenuous at best. To be sure, governmental en-
dorsement of religion may be divisive. By the same token, however, 
governmental refusal to endorse religion may be divisive. Indeed, if 
more than a few citizens believe that government should approve or 
support religion in some way, then a refusal by government to provide 
such approval or support may engender more contention than the ap-
proval itself would provoke. 150 Lynch is a case in point. Although 
Pawtucket's sponsorship of the creche manifestly offended some of the 
city's citizens, i.e., the plaintiffs, the attempt to remove the creche gen-
erated an even greater wave of opposition and hostility; the mayor 
testified that he had "never seen people as mad as they are over this 
issue."151 Nor is the Pawtucket experience atypical. 152 
Thus, adoption of a "no endorsement" principle would not end 
concurring). Similarly, presidential proclamations calling for public prayers of thanksgiving seem 
to be clear instances of endorsement. Nonetheless, in Wallace, O'Connor suggested that these 
proclamations are permissible, observing that unlike school prayers, such proclamations "are 
received in a noncoercive setting and are primarily directed at adults, who presumably are not 
readily susceptible to unwilling religious indoctrination." Wallace, 472 U.S. at 81 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). O'Connor's observation seems both accurate and wholly beside the point - at least 
if endorsement is the constitutional evil to be avoided. Her argument suggests that it is really 
coercion or unwilling indoctrination, not simple endorsemellt, that should be the touchstone of 
constitutionality. 
148. See Loewy, supra note 45, at 1070 ("[T]he best way for the Court to keep the peace is to 
refuse to tolerate endorsement or disapproval of religion."). 
149. Compare Lemon.v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) (declaring that "political divi-
sion along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was 
intended to protect"), with Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684 (denying that "political divisiveness alone can 
serve to invalidate otherwise permissible conduct"). See also Gibney, supra note 146, at 147 
("Political divisiveness is not a meaningful judicial standard"); McConnell, Political and Reli· 
gious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 413 ("Religious differences in this country 
have never generated the civil discord experienced in political conflicts over such issues as the 
Vietnam War, racial segregation, the Red Scare, unionization, or slavery."); Schwarz, No Imposi· 
tion of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 710-11 (1968) (criticizing 
divisiveness argument). 
150. See Paulsen, supra note 10, at 347 ("The invalidation of a 'divisive' policy because of its 
supposed 'divisiveness' can be the most 'divisive' action of all."). 
151. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. ll50, ll62 (D.R.I. 1981). 
152. See Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 94· 
98 (Supreme Court's establishment decisions have intensified rather than reduced religious con· 
flict); cj Baker, The Religion Clauses Reconsidered: The Jaffree Case, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 125, 
139 (1984) ("The Supreme Court's school-prayer decisions have fanned, rather than doused, the 
flames of religious factionalism."). 
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division along religious lines. 153 In the aggregate, moreover, it seems 
likely that adoption of such a principle would create incentives that 
would intensify religious conflicts. If the principle calls for invalida-
tion of laws that are perceived as endorsing or disapproving of religion, 
as in Justice O'Connor's formulation, then opponents of a particular 
measure have every incentive to wield the equivalent of a "heckler's 
veto" by manifesting their disapproving reaction in demonstrative 
ways. 154 Moreover, the same incentive may operate on both sides of a 
controversy; proponents of a measure may seek to demonstrate that its 
rejection or elimination would be perceived by many people as expres-
sing disapproval of a religious value or belief. A test creating such 
incentives to demonstrative opposition is difficult to defend as a 
method of reducing religious division. 155 
C. Endorsement and Political Standing 
Cognizant of these difficulties, Justice O'Connor eschews potential 
divisiveness as an element of establishment doctrine. 156 Similarly, she 
does not assume that the "no endorsement" principle is axiomatic or 
self-evident. Instead, she purports to derive the "no endorsement" test 
from a more fundamental theoretical argument. Her starting premise 
is that "[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits government from making 
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in 
the political community."157 This premise may need clarification; but 
the premise is at least an appealing proposition, 158 and the following 
153. Donald Beschle, although very much in favor of a "no endorsement" test, observes that 
faithful application of the test "is likely to outrage separationists" and will be "offensive to some 
accommodationists." Beschle, supra note 45, at 191. 
154. Even if the dispositive perceptions are those of the "objective observer" rather than of 
actual citizens, opponents of a measure might reasonably suppose that the visible reactions of 
actual human beings will at least influence a judge's opinion about what an "objective observer" 
would perceive. 
155. CJ Johnson, supra note 112, at 831 ("[B]y encouraging persons who are easily offended 
by religious symbolism to believe that the courts stand open to remedy their complaints, the 
courts foster divisive conflicts over religion."). 
156. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
157. 465 U.S. at 687; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring). 
158. In addition to its intrinsic appeal, Justice O'Connor's premise can claim historical plau-
sibility. In late seventeenth-century England, religious dissenters were tolerated but denied polit-
ical rights. See R. BARLOW, CITIZENSHIP AND CONSCIENCE 57-76 (1962). This situation 
persisted in the colonies; dissenters were often permitted to worship but were "excluded from 
universities and disqualified for office, whether civil, religious, pr military." L. LEVY. supra note 
5, at 4. The establishment clause may well have been meant to remedy this situation. Thus, 
Thomas Jefferson·s original religious freedom bill for Virginia had decreed that "our civil rights 
have no dependance on our religious opinions." Jefferson, A Bil/for Establishing Religious Free-
dom (1779), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 77 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987) (em-
phasis added). And Madison's first proposed version of what became the establishment clause 
provided that "[t]he civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or wor-
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analysis will assume that it is, in some sense, correct. O'Connor then 
asserts that governmental endorsement of religion "sends a message to 
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community."159 Although this proposition may be debatable,160 the 
present discussion will accept the proposition as provisionally true. 
Even if both propositions are accepted, however, O'Connor's argu-
ment nonetheless fails because she provides no plausible link between 
them. Her attempt to tie endorsement of religion to the political 
standing of citizens is unpersuasive. To be sure, a law diminishing or 
elevating the political standing of citizens on religious grounds might 
also endorse or disapprove of religion, and vice versa. But those con-
sequences of such a law are practically and analytically distinct. Thus, 
a doctrine forbidding endorsement of religion would operate haphaz-
ardly at best in preventing diminution or elevation of citizens' political 
status on the basis of their religion. 
At one time, for instance, many states had laws which excluded 
clergy from serving in the legislature; Tennessee's exclusionary provi-
sion survived until 1978, when it was struck down by the Supreme 
Court.161 These laws plainly affected some persons' political standing 
on the basis of religion; the exclusionary laws made those persons inel-
igible for legislative office simply because they had chosen a religious 
vocation. On the other hand, whether the laws communicated ap-
proval or disapproval of religion is debatable; and the question con-
ceivably might be answered differently in different jurisdictions.162 
Such a law might reflect disapproval of religion, implying that minis-
ters are unfit for public office. 163 Conversely, the law might suggest 
approval of religion; it might evince a belief that ministers are too vir-
ship." T. CURRY, supra note 139, at 199 (emphasis added). Historian Sidney Mead thus con-
cludes that disestablishment meant that "sectarian dogmas and beliefs were made irrelevant to 
one's being and status as a citizen of the Republic." S. MEAD, supra note 56, at 41. 
159. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
160. Persons who are in the minority on any issue may feel disappointment when their values 
or objectives are not adopted by government, but they need not feel like "outsiders" or lesser 
members of the political community. Mark Tushnet suggests that religious issues are no different 
from other political issues in this respect: "[N]onadherents who believe that they are excluded 
from the political community are merely expressing the disappointment felt by everyone who has 
lost a fair fight in the arena of politics." Tushnet, supra note 12, at 712. 
161. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). Professor Loewy cites McDaniel as a prime 
example of the potential explanatory value of a "no endorsement" test. Loewy, supra note 45, at 
1052. 
162. Such exclusionary laws were carried over from England, where "the practice of exclud-
ing clergy from the House of Commons was justified on a variety of grounds." McDaniel, 435 
U.S. at 622 (plurality opinion). 
163. See Gallant, Disestablished Religion in Pennsylvania and Kentucky: A Study in Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 8 J. LEGJS. HIST. (forthcoming) (asserting that Kentucky's exclusionary 
provision was inspired by anticlericalism). 
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tuous, or are engaged in too important a calling, to be sullied and dis-
tracted by mundane political pursuits.164 Or the law might reflect 
neither approval nor disapproval of religion, but merely a belief that 
both religion and politics are better off when kept apart. Whether a 
given exclusionary law endorses or disapproves of religion thus re-
mains an open question that cannot be answered without further fac-
tual investigation. By contrast, no similar factual investigation is 
needed in order to decide that the law affects political standing on 
religious grounds; it plainly does. The critical point is that a law bar-
ring clergy from the legislature affects political status on the basis of 
religion whether or not the law also endorses or disapproves of 
religion. 165 
If laws can alter political status without endorsing or disapproving 
religion, the reverse is also true; a law or governmental practice can 
endorse religion without altering political standing. Ceremonial uses 
of prayer, such as the invocation given before a legislative session, or 
public religious allusions such as the motto on coins confessing "In 
God We Trust," may communicate support or approval for religious 
beliefs. 166 But such endorsements do not appear to alter anyone's ac-
tual political standing in any realistic sense; no one loses the right to 
vote, the freedom to speak, or any other state or federal right if he or 
she does not happen to share the religious ideas that such practices 
appear to approve. 
Of course, a message suggesting that minorities are not regarded 
and treated as full members of the political community might be true; 
minorities might actually be discriminated against in their political 
and civil rights. That possibility, however, hardly lends support to a 
164. The Tennessee constitutional provision, for instance, was explicitly based upon the 
premise that "Ministers of the Gospel are by their profession, dedicated to God and the care of 
Souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of their functions." McDaniel, 435 U.S. 
at 621 n.l (quoting TENN. CoNsr. art. VIII,§ 1 (1796)). 
165. Loewy cites the invalidation of religious oath requirements, see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 
U.S. 488 (1961), as another major instance Qfthe explanatory value ofa "no endorsement" test. 
Loewy, supra note 45, at 1052. But once again the effect of an oath requirement on political 
standing is analytically independent of whether it endorses religion. Imagine, for instance, that 
some creative historian demonstrates to everyone's satisfaction that a particular religious oath 
requirement originated with a governor who was indifferent to religion and whose purpose in 
imposing the requirement was to exclude from office a political rival who happened to be an 
atheist. Or the historical evidence might show that the oath requirement was originally imposed 
by a madman whose only intent was to be arbitrary or bizarre. Such evidence might convince 
everyone that the law had not actually been intended to indicate approval of religion; the law 
might thereby lose its "endorsement" effect. Nonetheless, the law's "status alteration" effect 
would remain unimpaired; atheists would still be excluded from office. Thus, "endorsement" 
and "status alteration" represent distinct, and severable, consequences of the law. 
166. Cf. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Re-
cellt Developments, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 943, 947 (1986) ("The placement of 'In God We 
Trust' on coins and currency ... seems to have no real purpose other than a religious one."). 
308 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:266 
test which specifies endorsement as the constitutional evil. Let us sup-
pose that endorsements send messages telling minorities that they are 
not full members of the political community, and that they will be 
discriminated against in their political and civil rights. Such messages 
are either false or true. If the messages are false, and no discrimina-
tion is in fact occurring, then government is not in fact violating Jus-
tice O'Connor's basic premise that political standing should be 
independent of religion. If the messages are true, then government is 
violating that premise; but it is violating the premise by making reli-
gion relevant to political standing, not by sending messages which ac-
curately acknowledge that fact. In this context, a doctrinal test or 
principle which focuses upon the message, rather than upon the under-
lying evil reflected in that message, seems positively perverse. 
Thus, Justice O'Connor's premise divorcing religion from political 
standing does not logically lead to a "no endorsement" principle. In-
deed, if taken literally, the proposition that religion should be irrele-
vant to political standing might even preclude such a principle. 
Eligibility to receive public benefits is arguably an important compo-
nent of one's standing in the political community. By invalidating 
measures that are intended or perceived as endorsements of religion, 
however, O'Connor's test impedes government from subsidizing or as-
sisting religious interests to the same extent and with the same free-
dom that it subsidizes or assists other kinds of interests. In a real 
sense, therefore, persons or institutions for whom such interests are 
central are less eligible for public benefits than are citizens or institu-
tions for whom religious interests are not central. 167 Government can 
pay the salaries of school teachers - unless, that is, they choose to 
teach in religious schools. 168 Congress can directly subsidize farmers 
if it believes the public interest would be served (or even if farmers 
simply have a strong enough lobby to exact a subsidy). But Congress 
cannot on those grounds, or on any other grounds, directly subsidize 
clergy or Christian missionary societies; such a subsidy would surely 
be perceived as endorsing religion. Thus, taken at face value, 
O'Connor's premise that religion should not be "relevant in any way" 
to political standing not only fails to support a "no endorsement" 
167. Cf Fink, The Establishment Clause According to the Supreme Court: The Mysterious 
Eclipse of Free Exercise Values, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 207, 214 (1978) (for religious persons, 
establishment decisions have resulted in "denial of full participation in the redistributive efforts 
of the welfare state"). 
168. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); cf P. KAUPER, RELIGION 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1964) ("[I]f public funds are made available for all educational 
institutions whether public or private except those that are under the control of a religious body, 
it is indeed hard to avoid the conclusion that the religious factor is being used as a ground for 
disqualification from public benefits."). 
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principle, but indeed contradicts it. 169 
If the goal of the establishment clause is to make political standing 
independent of religion, therefore, the proper doctrinal direction seems 
almost embarrassingly plain: The Supreme Court should develop doc-
trine which invalidates laws or practices that affect political or civil 
rights on religious grounds. There is no apparent reason for the Court 
instead to adopt a doctrinal test focusing upon an altogether different 
factor which is at best a less than faithful proxy for the goal the Court 
seeks to achieve. 
D. Alienation and Messages of Exclusion 
Even if Justice O'Connor has failed to link messages of endorse-
ment to a diminution of actual political standing, one might still agree 
with her contention that such messages are undesirable. It seems both 
humane and politically expedient, after all, that government should 
refrain from acting in ways that alienate some of it~ constituents by 
making them feel like "outsiders," even if the political and civil rights 
of such persons are not thereby diminished. Thus, a more sympathetic 
response to Justice O'Connor's argument might suggest that the "no 
endorsement" principle can be justified on the basis of a "nonaliena-
tion" policy, quite apart from any dubious linkage to "political 
standing." 
In evaluating this suggestion, a broader reference to more general 
constitutional protections for belief and expression is helpful. The 
Supreme Court has ruled that the freedom of belief is absolute; 170 and 
the freedom of speech, though not absolute, has received rigorous doc-
trinal protection.171 At the same time, the Constitution does not pre-
vent government from adopting views and expressing judgments on a 
vast range of subjects. 172 In making and expressing such judgments, 
169. The foregoing analysis assumes that "standing in the political community" means some-
thing like enjoyment of the full rights and privileges of citizenship, including equal treatment 
under state and federal law, and perhaps equal eligibility for public benefits. This conception 
seems consistent with historical evidence suggesting that disestablishment made religion irrele-
vant to "civil rights." See note 158 supra. Justice O'Connor may have a different conception of 
"political standing"; but if so, she has not articulated, nor is it easy to infer, just what that 
conception is. 
170. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). 
171. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing to enjoin 
publication of material allegedly affecting national security even though some Justices voting in 
majority conceded that immediate and irreparable injury to the nation would follow); Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (expanding protection for speech advocating violence). 
172. Thomas Emerson observes that "the first amendment . . . has served to prevent the 
government from prohibiting, harassing, or interfering with speech .... [It] has not been viewed 
as a significant factor ... to impose limits on governmental participation in the system [of expres-
sion]." Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 795 (1981). 
Although Emerson and others have sought to articulate limits on governmental speech, see also 
I 
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government inevitably endorses some beliefs, disapproves others, and 
acts in ways that may cause some adherents of disfavored beliefs to 
feel like "outsiders"; but that consequence hardly precludes govern-
ment from making judgments. 173 Indeed, because governmental dis-
approval of the beliefs of particular citizens does not prevent such 
citizens from voting, running for office, advocating their own posi-
tions, serving on juries, or claiming the full panoply of rights extended 
by state and federal law, those citizens are considered to be fully pro-
tected in their freedoms of belief and expression. 
Of course, some people may feel inhibited in matters of belief and 
expression by the knowledge that particular positions have been en-
dorsed or rejected by government; and someone conceivably might 
propose that this inhibition be eliminated, and that the freedoms of 
belief and expression be given even greater protection, through the 
adoption of a prohibition forbidding governmental messages which 
disapprove of the beliefs of some citizens and cause them to feel like 
"outsiders." But such a proposal would be ill-conceived. Government 
cannot act without making judgments; and such judgments will inevi-
tably conflict with, and thereby imply disapproval of, 'the beliefs of 
some citizens. Unless we are attracted to governmental paralysis, 
therefore, we must reject any generalized nonalienation requirement. 
Justice O'Connor's argument for forbidding messages that make 
some people feel like "outsiders" on religious grounds, though di-
rected at a narrower category of messages, is vulnerable to· a similar 
objection. Religious diversity in this country is rich enough to ensure 
that any governmental policy in an area that potentially concerns reli-
gion will probably alienate some people. If public institutions employ 
religious symbols, persons who do not adhere to the predominant reli-
gion may feel like "outsiders." But if religious symbols are banned 
M. YUOOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS (1983); Shilfrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. 
REV. 565 (1980); Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 
67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979), such limits at present exist only in the realm of academic theory. 
Cf Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (Congress can subsidize lobby-
ing activities of some organizations while denying subsidies to other such organizations); Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976) (rejecting argument that speech clause limits government's 
ability to fund political campaigns). Moreover, even if limits were actually adopted, they clearly 
could not amount to a general prohibition on the formation and expression of judgments by 
government, since the formation and expression of judgments is an inherent part of the process of 
governing. 
173. For instance, communists may regularly be made to feel like "outsiders" by government 
pronouncements and actions condemning communism. In some states, and during some periods, 
Democrats - or Republicans, or members of any other political party or persuasion - may be 
made to feel like "outsiders" by government pronouncements disapproving their respective be· 
liefs. The first amendment protects the right of all such persons and groups to hold and advocate 
their beliefs; it does not impose any prohibition precluding government from acting in ways that 
will disapprove their views and make them feel like "outsiders." 
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from such contexts, some religious people will feel that their most cen-
tral values and concerns - and thus, in an important sense, they 
themselves - have been excluded from a public culture devoted 
purely to secular concerns. Once again, Lynch is illustrative: Whether 
the creche was included in or removed from the Christmas display, the 
sincere religious sensibilities of some citizens would be offended. 174 
Cogent or not, the polemics of what may be called the "religious 
right" provide powerful evidence of the alienation and frustration gen-
erated by Supreme Court decisions that have excluded religious prac-
tices from some areas of public life, such as the schools, 175 and that 
have established, in the view of some believers, an antireligious "secu-
lar humanism."176 
Indeed, alienation produced by Supreme Court decisions may be 
even more severe than alienation provoked by actions oflegislatures or 
lower government officials. Legislative or municipal action, after all, 
represents temporary and possibly correctable policy - often of only a 
particular state or municipality. Offensive constitutional decisions, on 
the other hand, send a message telling the disfavored that their central 
beliefs and values are incompatible with the fundamental and enduring 
principles upon which the Republic rests. 
Nearly everyone, of course, will feel greater sympathy for some 
groups that have been alienated by government policies than for other 
174. The plaintiffs in the case viewed the creche as an endorsement of Christianity. See note 
132 supra. On the other hand, the attempt to remove the creche provoked an outpouring of 
opposition, including a number of letters that were introduced at trial. The district court stated 
that these letters "evidence a deep concern about and resentment for what most of the correspon-
dents regarded as an attack on a cherished religious symbol. . . . Overall the tenor of the corre-
spondence is that the lawsuit represents an attack on the presence of religion as part of the 
community's life .... " Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1162 (D.R.I. 1981), ajfd., 691 
F.2d 1029 (!st Cir. 1982), revd., 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
Another current issue illustrating the difficulty is the question of whether student religious 
groups should be permitted to meet in public schools on essentially the same terms as other 
student groups. Compare Teitel, When Separate is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises, 
Unlike Chess, Do Not Belong in Public Schools, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 174 (1986) (arguing that 
permitting religious groups to meet communicates governmental support for religion), with Es-
beck, Religion and a Neutral State: Imperative or Impossibility, 15 CUMB. L. REV. 67, 71 (1984) 
(condemning exclusion of religious student groups as "shamefully discriminatory"). 
175. Michael McConnell notes that the " 'religious right' argues that an entirely secular pub-
lic school will be perceived by students as hostile toward religion." McConnell, Neutrality Under 
the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 146, 164 (1986). See also Schwarz, The Nonestablish-
ment Principle: A Reply to Professor Giannel/a, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1477 (1968) (noting 
"the anti-religionism of the public schools"). 
176. The charge that the Supreme Court's religion clause decisions have established "secular 
humanism" is not confined to fundamentalist preachers and right wing politicians, but has found 
expression in the academic literature as well. See, e.g., Hitchcock, Church, State, and Moral 
Values: The Limits of American Pluralism, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 9-19 (Spring 1981); 
Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism in the Public Schools, 1979 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 177; Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Human-
ism and Its First Amendment Implications, IO TEX. TECH. L. REV. I (1978). 
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such groups. Nor are such sympathies necessarily illegitimate; it may 
be that adequate reasons can be given for concluding that the aliena-
tion felt by Jews, Moslems, agnostics, or other religious minorities is 
constitutionally cognizable, whereas the alienation felt by Fundamen-
talist Christians should not influence constitutional policy (or vice 
versa). Suppose, for instance, that a historian or constitutional theo-
rist were to advance a compelling exposition and argument in favor of, 
let us say, a theory of "strict separation." The exposition is so lucid 
and the argument so compelling, we may suppose, that the "strict sep-
aration" construction gains general acceptance by virtually all judges 
and scholars, and quickly becomes the law of the land. Nonetheless, 
some groups would inevitably object to the content or consequences of 
such a construction, perhaps because they believe that government 
should support religion and that separation amounts to "political athe-
ism." 177 We might conclude, however, that any alienation felt by such 
groups, although perfectly sincere, should be disregarded because their 
dissatisfaction actually results not from particular governmental ac-
tions but rather from the very meaning of the establishment clause. 
We could, in other words, properly distinguish between groups who 
are alienated by violations of the establishment clause and groups who 
are offended by the establishment clause itself. 
This possibility assumes, however, that a correct exposition of the 
establishment clause would specify something other than prevention of 
alienation as the clause's controlling purpose. Conversely, if the cen-
tral purpose of the establishment clause is simply to prevent alienation 
(and the messages which cause it), then the distinction between justi-
fied and unjustified alienation disappears. What is justified must be 
determined, after all, by reference to the establishment clause. If the 
purpose of the clause is simply to prevent alienation, then if govern-
ment produces alienation, that fact alone demonstrates that the estab-
lishment clause has been violated. 
Thus, an approach which emphasizes the prevention of alienation 
as the purpose of the establishment clause is perhaps the only ap-
proach which, instead of grounding distinctions between justified and 
unjustified complaints by alienated groups, in fact legitimates all such 
complaints. And if virtually every governmental action or measure, 
including a "no endorsement" test, 178 will alienate some persons on 
religious grounds, then the nonalienation approach to the establish-
ment clause is simply unworkable. 
177. See J. MURRAY, THE PROBLEM OF Goo 99-100 (1964) (describing modern notions of 
church-state separation as "political atheism"'). 
178. See note 153 supra. 
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In sum, the fact that citizens may sometimes feel like "outsiders," 
however unfortunate, does not provide a secure doctrinal foundation 
for the protection either of belief and expression generally or of reli-
gious belief in particular. Ultimately, a degree of alienation must be 
acknowledged as an inevitable cost of maintaining government in a 
pluralistic culture. In such a culture, some beliefs must, but not all 
beliefs can, achieve recognition and ratification in the nation's laws 
and public policies; and those whose positions are not so favored will 
sometimes feel like "outsiders." Because the phenomenon is inherent 
in a pluralistic culture, the aspiration to abolish that phenomenon, or 
to develop a conception of "political standing" that includes a right 
not to feel like an "outsider," constitutes a utopian vision rather than a 
realistic basis for formulating constitutional doctrine. 
IV. THE ALLURE OF NEUTRALITY 
The foregoing analysis suggests that several possible justifications 
for the "no endorsement" test, including the one suggested by Justice 
O'Connor, are seriously flawed. But this conclusion produces a puz-
zle: If O'Connor's test is deficient as doctrine, and if the theoretical 
justifications offered for the test are unpersuasive, then why has the 
"no endorsement" proposal generated such widespread support? The 
solution to this puzzle appears only when the test is viewed against the 
backdrop of the long-standing quest to define a position of governmen-
tal neutrality towards religion. 
A. The Quest for Neutrality 
It is hardly surprising that the idea of "neutrality" has exerted a 
magnetic attraction in establishment analysis. History amply demon-
strates that controversies over religious issues can be onerous on a 
number of levels - theological, psychological, political - and it is 
enticing to think that government might somehow remain aloof from 
such controversies. The idea of neutrality appears to offer this possi-
bility; it evokes the image of a government which can stand dispassion-
ately above the fray, shunning involvement in religious disputes while 
maintaining a fair and impartial stance that offends none of the parties 
to such disputes. 
Hence, in its first modern establishment case, the Supreme Court 
committed itself to the ideal of neutrality. 179 Later cases fastened even 
179. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 18 (1947) (declaring that the establishment 
clause "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and 
non-believers"). 
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more firmly onto neutrality as the guiding principle for regulating 
church-state relations; 180 and the emphasis upon neutrality was pre-
served through the adoption of the Lemon test. 181 In its most recent 
term, the Court reaffirmed its commitment to neutrality as an estab-
lishment ideal. 182 Like the Court itself, countless commentators have 
advocated neutrality as the fundamental tenet of the establishment 
clause. 183 
This pervasive commitment to neutrality has not yet generated any 
clear and convincing account of what neutrality actually entails. It 
has become increasingly clear, rather, that neutrality is a "coat of 
many colors." 184 Thus far, the concept's protean character has not 
noticeably undermined its appeal, and may even have enhanced it; vir-
tually anyone can find a nostrum to his liking in the cabinet of neutral-
ity. However, the slipperiness of the concept has impeded the 
development of coherent and predictable doctrine. Everson v. Board of 
Education 185 foreshado)Ved the confusion. The question in the case 
was whether a state could pay for the cost of busing students to and 
from parochial schools. All of the Justices wanted to find an answer 
compatible with the idea of neutrality. However, some Justices 
thought that since the state already transported public school stu-
dents, neutrality required that parochial school students receive simi-
180. E.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970); Abington School Dist. v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214-26 (1963). 
18I. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 618 (1971). The Court derived the "secular 
purpose and effect" prongs of the Lemon test from the Schempp decision and the "entanglement" 
prong from the Walz decision. Both of these decisions had emphasized the centrality of neutral-
ity in establishment jurisprudence. 
182. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862, 2867 (1987); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commn., 107 S. Ct. 
1046, 1051 (1987). 
183. E.g., Laycock, supra note 5, at 409; Braveman, supra note 16, at 353; Esbeck, supra note 
174, at 68, 86; Beschle, supra note 45, at 174; Paulsen, supra note 10, at 325-26; Note, The Myth 
of Religious Neutrality by Separation in Education, 71 VA. L. REV. 127, 127-29, 166-67 (1985); 
Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Jnterpretatio11 of the Establish-
ment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1475 (1981) [hereinafter Columbia Note]; Bird, Freedom 
from Establishment and Unneutrality in Public Sc/zoo/ Instruction and Religious Sc/zoo/ Regula-
tion, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY. 125, 138 (1979); Wheeler, Establislz111e11t Clause Neutrality and 
the Reasonable Acco111111odation Requirement, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 901, 911-14 (1977); Gi-
annella, Religious Liberty, No11estab/islz111ent, and Doctrinal Development, Part fl· The Nonestab-
lislzment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 513-14 (1968); W. KATZ, supra note 14, at 13; P. 
KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LA w 112 (1962); see also Johnson, supra note 112, at 818 
("That in some sense the federal government and the states ought to be 'neutral' in religious 
matters is undisputed .... "). 
184. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring). For discus-
sions distinguishing or categorizing different versions of neutrality, see Note, Government 
Nonilzvolvement with Religious Institutio11s, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 921, 931-33 (1981); Wheeler, 
supra note 183, at 911-15; M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 152-54 (1965); P. 
KAUPER, supra note 168, at 70-76. 
185. 330 U.S. l (1947). 
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lar treatment, while other Justices believed the demands of neutrality 
were fully satisfied by allowing all students to attend public school if 
they chose.186 
The frequently noted inconsistency of results under the Lemon test 
indicates that the essential indeterminacy remains as vigorous as ever. 
Nor is the malady likely to be cured. If the problem were simply that 
government lacks the will to adhere to a clear principle, as commenta-
tors occasionally suggest, 187 the case would be more hopeful. Steeling 
itself to resist religious pressure and to disregard entrenched religious 
traditions, the Supreme Court could simply force government to be 
neutral. Indeed, even if the tension between the neutrality thought to 
be required by the establishment clause and the accommodation de-
manded by the free exercise clause is taken into account, there might 
still be room for hope; the Court just might hit upon a construction of 
the free exercise clause that would reduce the tension. 188 
Unfortunately, the root of the difficulty runs deeper still. Scholars 
are coming to recognize that the very concept of neutrality is inher-
ently indeterminate. 189 Professor John Valauri has recently argued 
that establishment neutrality has been and must be understood to con-
tain two components: noninvolvement and impartiality. In many con-
texts, however, these components push in opposite directions. Thus, 
"[t]he concept of neutrality is indeterminate because it is irresolvably 
and multiply ambiguous."190 
Another sign of the conceptual breakdown is the disagreement 
about the relationship between neutrality and other establishment val-
ues such as separation and voluntarism. The Everson Court supposed, 
as have many commentators, that these values are harmonious and 
186. Compare Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (majority opinion), with 330 U.S. at 58-60 (Rutledge, 
J., dissenting). For a more extensive discussion of the confusion evident in Everson with regard 
to neutrality, see Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. 
PIIT. L. REV. 83, 94-104 (1986). 
187. E.g., Columbia Note, supra note 183, at 1466-77. 
188. For instance, Justice Stevens has suggested that there should be "virtually no room" for 
constitutionally required exemptions from laws that are neutral towards religion in their general 
application. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring). Whatever 
its other merits or drawbacks, Stevens' position would at least reduce the need to qualify estab-
lishment neutrality in order to satisfy free exercise requirements, since the free exercise clause 
would no longer impose any significant requirements beyond "neutrality." 
) 
189. Doubts about the coherence of neutrality as a value are not limited to the role of that 
value in church-state jurisprudence. See, e.g., Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and 
Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 40-47 (1984); Frug, Why Neutrality?, 92 YALE L.J. 1591 (1983); 
Hyde, Is Liberalism Possible? (Book Review), 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1036-41 (1982). 
190. Valauri, supra note 186, at 93. See generally id. at 84-128. See also McConnell, supra 
note 175, at 161-64 (arguing that where government has a pervasive presence, neutrality is im-
possible because even "a government practice of 'strict neutrality' ... is not truly neutral"). 
316 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:266 
mutually supporting, 191 but critics argue that such values are in fact 
often incompatible. 192 In a similar vein, neutrality is said by some to 
require "accommodation" of religion, and by others to forbid it. 193 
The quest for neutrality has thus created a conundrum. We re-
quire government to be neutral. But our attempts to say what neutral-
ity means tum out to be indeterminate and deeply ambiguous. 
B. The Jurisprudence of Symbolism 
At this point, the neutrality enterprise may enlist in its aid a propo-
sal that can be described as the "jurisprudence of symbolism." This 
proposal urges that in applying the establishment clause, the judiciary 
should be less concerned about whether a law actually benefits reli-
gion, but should invalidate measures that appear to favor religion. 
Professor William Marshall, who has advanced the most thoughtful 
and systematic version of this position, explains that "a jurisprudence 
that is primarily 'symbolic' and not 'substantive' [is] ... concerned less 
with the substantive goal of limiting certain types of government in-
volvements and supports of religion than with eliminating the percep-
tion of improper government action." 194 
191. Everson emphatically favored all of these values, seemingly regarding them not only as 
consistent but as almost interchangeable. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 11 ("individual religious lib· 
erty"); 330 U.S. at 13 ("religious liberty"); 330 U.S. at 16 ("wall of separation"); 330 U.S. at 18 
(neutrality, separation). See also Laycock, supra note 18, at 7 (separationists agree that govern· 
ment should be neutral); Columbia Note, supra note 183, at 1463 (equating strict separation with 
strict neutrality). 
192. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 175, at 147 (separation value not neutral); id. at 151 
(religious liberty requires departures from neutrality); Gedicks, Motivation, Rationality, and Sec· 
ular Purpose in Establishment Clause Review, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 677, 686-87 (showing tension 
between values of separation, voluntarism, and neutrality). 
193. Compare Cornelius, supra note 10, at 36 (neutrality requires accommodation), and J. 
WHITEHEAD, THE FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN THE PUBLIC HIGH SCHOOLS 10-17 
(1983) (same), with Columbia Note, supra note 183, at 1474-75 ("strict neutrality" precludes aid 
to religion). See also P. KAUPER, supra note 168, at 70-75 (arguing that accommodation modi· 
fies neutrality). 
194. Marshall, supra note 45, at 498 (emphasis added). Marshall illustrates the distinction as 
follows: "[A]ssume a state provides direct financial payment to a minister. The establishment 
harm is not in the payment. It is in what the payment symbolizes." Id. at 513. Under this 
approach, "programs with only minimally favorable religious effects may create establishment 
problems, while programs with highly substantial effects may not." Id. at 531-32. 
Although Marshall has provided the most developed exposition of the jurisprudence of sym· 
bolism, he is certainly not its only advocate. The Supreme Court has exhibited an increasing 
concern with the symbolic consequences of establishment doctrine and decisions. See text at 
notes 201-06 infra. So have other academic commentators. See, e.g .. Kurland, supra note 11, at 
6 (arguing that church-state issues "may be more important as symbols than for pragmatic rca· 
sons"); Crabb, Religious Symbols, American Traditions and the Co11stitutio11, 1984 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 509 (adopting symbolic approach, but arguing that some use of religious symbols should be 
permitted); L. TRIBE, supra note 115, at 843-44 (emphasizing importance of "symbolic impact" 
in assessing aid to religious schools); Harvard Note, supra note 45, at 1689-93 (emphasizing 
importance of "symbolic linkage" in establishment decisions). 
Likewise, although wary of giving constitutional protection to symbols, see Johnson, supra 
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The jurisprudence of symbolism seeks to solve the problem of de-
fining actual neutrality by skirting it: Since experience shows that we 
cannot agree upon what neutrality actually is, perhaps we should table 
the matter, and instead concern ourselves with whether governmental 
action appears to be, or not to be, neutral. 195 Thus, the argument for a 
symbolic jurisprudence begins by showing the impossibility of resolv-
ing establishment problems on the basis of "substantive" principles. 196 
The argument then holds out the jurisprudence of symbolism as the 
avenue of escape from these analytical difficulties. 197 Although advo-
cates of this approach have not spelled out as clearly as one might 
wish just how the jurisprudence of symbolism escapes conceptual diffi-
culties, the underlying logic of their position can be extrapolated. The 
invitation to adopt the appearance of neutrality as the dispositive crite-
rion is seductive because it seemingly requires us only to know our 
own minds and perceptions. Perhaps we cannot define just what it 
would mean for government to be neutral; but surely we can at least 
say when an action appears to be neutral. 
In this respect, the jurisprudence of symbolism is reminiscent of 
broader philosophical attempts to overcome difficulties in achieving 
knowledge of the external world by turning inward and adopting our 
own perceptions as the proper objects of immediate knowledge. The 
"sense datum" approach to knowledge advocated by phenomenalistic 
philosophers in the first half of this century illustrates the strategy. 198 
note 112, at 831, Phillip Johnson stresses the importance of appearances; he argues that 
"[g]ovemment must seem to be evenhanded about religious disputes. What it does may coincide 
with the wishes of some groups and thwart the plans of others, but this coincidence must seem to 
be the outcome of neutral principles or fair-minded interest balancing, rather than conscious 
partisanship ... . "Id. at 845 (emphasis added). Perhaps remembering that he has elsewhere 
criticized "sham neutrality" by the courts, Johnson, Do You Sincerely Want to Be Radical?, 36 
STAN. L. REV. 247, 266-80 (1984), Johnson hastens to add that "[t]he emphasis upon neutrality 
is not necessarily deceptive." Johnson, supra note 112, at 845. In view of Johnson's bleak depic-
tion of the possibility of articulating neutral principles in this area, id. at 820-39, however, it is 
hard to see how a decision that would "seem to be the outcome of neutral principles" could be 
anything but deceptive. 
195. Like Justice O'Connor, Marshall explicitly refers to "endorsement," not "neutrality," as 
his central concern. Marshall, supra note 45, at 513. A concern about preventing "endorsement" 
of religion, however, can best be understood as an expression of the goal of maintaining symbolic 
neutrality toward religion. See note 210 infra and accompanying text. 
196. See Marshall, supra note 45, at 500-03. Marshall concludes that ''.[e]stablishment prin-
ciples are simply not susceptible to consistent implementation." Id. at 513. Johnson similarly 
observes that establishment doctrine is "radically indeterminate" and that "the doctrinal objec-
tives are inherently contradictory." Johnson, supra note 112, at 820, 839. 
197. Marshall asserts that "a symbolic approach absorbs the tensions within establishment'" 
and suggests that Justice O'Connor's Lynch opinion demonstrates how this reconciliation occurs. 
Marshall, supra note 45, at 532. In light of the outrage generated by Lynch. and the insistence by 
many critics that the creche was clearly an endorsement of Christianity, see notes 15-19 & 132 
supra and accompanying text, this claim is at least a courageous one. 
198. See, e.g., A.J. AYER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE (1940); B. RUS-
SELL, OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD 75-134 (2d ed. 1929). 
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Such philosophers argued that by focusing on perceptual phenomena 
we can achieve certainty, at least in some matters. 199 If I say, "A cow 
is standing by the barn," my assertion may be wrong. The animal 
standing by the barn may be a horse. Or there may be nothing "out 
there" at all; I may be hallucinating. But if I say, "I see a brown 
patch," I cannot be wrong, since I am only making an assertion re-
garding my own sense perceptions, about which I can hardly be mis-
taken. 200 At least, so the argument runs. 
Arguments for an establishment doctrine that focuses on appear-
ances or perceptions evince a similar logic. If I say that government is, 
or is not, acting neutrally, someone may - and usually will - disa-
gree. But if I merely say that government appears (to me) to be acting 
neutrally, how can anyone contradict me? Of course, as soon as I 
make the broader assertion that a law appears neutral not only to me 
but to people generally, or to a "reasonable" or "objective" observer, 
the possibility of disagreement is revived. Still, no one can plausibly 
dispute (can anyone?) that I have at least described how the law ap-
pears to me; and the very fact that the law appears neutral to me 
should at least count as evidence for the more unqualified assertion 
about how the law "appears." Most importantly, my assertion that a 
law "appears" neutral cannot be refuted by arguments showing that in 
some sense the law is not actually neutral, since my assertion does not 
purport to say anything about the law's actual neutrality. Thus, the 
shift to a phenomenalistic doctrine which focuses upon the symbolic 
aspects of governmental action seems to offer a less vulnerable founda-
tion for making assertions and drawing conclusions, while eliminating 
the necessity of defining what neutrality actually is. 
199. A.J. Ayer contended that a sense-datum proposition is "incorrigible," or incapable of 
being falsified, because "it is completely verified by the existence of the sense-datum which it 
describes; and so it is inferred that to doubt the truth of such a proposition is not merely irra-
tional but meaningless." A.J. AYER, supra note 198, at 83. Bertrand Russell argued that the 
"hardest of hard data" consist of sense data and logical truths, and that to doubt such data 
would be "pathological." B. RUSSELL, supra note 198, at 75. 
200. H.H. Price expressed the argument illustratively: 
When I see a tomato there is much that I can doubt. I can doubt whether it is a tomato 
that I am seeing, and not a cleverly painted piece of wax. I can doubt whether there is any 
material thing there at all. Perhaps what I took for a tomato was really a reflection; perhaps 
I am even the victim of some hallucination. One thing however I cannot doubt: that there 
exists a red patch of a round and somewhat bulgy shape, standing out from a background of 
other colour-patches, and having a certain visual depth, and that this whole field of colour is 
directly present to my consciousness. What the red patch is, whether a substance, or a state 
of a substance, or an event, whether it is physical or psychical or neither, are questions that 
we may doubt about. But that something is red and round then and there I cannot doubt. 
Whether the something persists even for a moment before and after it is present to my 
consciousness, whether other minds can be conscious of it as well as I, may be doubted. But 
that it now exists, and that I am conscious of it - by me at least who am conscious of it this 
cannot possibly be doubted. 
H. PRICE, PERCEPTION 3 (rev. 2d ed. 1950) (emphasis in original) {footnote omitted). 
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C. The "No Endorsement" Test as an Expression 
of Symbolic Neutrality 
319 
Justice O'Connor is not the first jurist to be drawn to the jurispru-
dence of symbolism. Professor Marshall argues that a large number of 
seemingly inconsistent establishment decisions can be reconciled on 
symbolic grounds.201 Whether Marshall's proffered reconciliations are 
persuasive is perhaps debatable; a severe reader might instead view 
Marshall's analysis as powerful evidence for his later observation that 
"a symbolic theory is ... subject to extraordinary manipulation."202 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court's occasional concern for sym-
bolism has become explicit. Thus, although programs subsidizing reli-
gious schools may be unconstitutional, 203 functionally similar 
programs have been upheld when monetary aid is given directly to the 
students, or to their parents, rather than to the school itself. 204 By 
eliminating the religious institution as the direct recipient of state 
funds, the Court has said, such programs avoid communicating an 
"imprimatur of State approval" for the institution. 205 And the Court 
has emphasized the importance in evaluating school aid programs of 
"symbolic impact" and of a possible "symbolic union of government 
and religion. " 206 
Although the current Lemon test may be loose enough to permit 
consideration of symbolic factors, however, the test's emphasis upon 
the "principal or primary effect" of a law more naturally encompasses 
the law's substantive consequences, not merely the appearances it cre-
ates. The test as verbalized retains a commitment to actual neutrality, 
not merely to symbolic neutrality. Consequently, an opinion explain-
ing why a law is neutral in appearance can still be embarrassed by the 
objection that the law in fact confers sizable material benefits on reli-
gion, and thereby deviates from actual neutrality.207 
Justice O'Connor's "no endorsement" test removes this embarrass-
201. Marshall, supra note 45, at 514-31. 
202. Id. at 533. 
203. E.g .. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Committee for Publi~ Educ. & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
204. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); see also Witters v. Washington Dept. ofServs. for 
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (reversing Washington decision which invalidated grant of voca-
tional aid to blind student studying for the ministry). 
205. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399. 
206. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390-92 (1985). 
207. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 409 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pointing out that although 
school aid program was facially neutral, about 96% of parents eligible for tuition deduction sent 
their children to religious schools). 
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ment by carefully embracing the jurisprudence of symbolism.208 The 
shift is most conspicuous in the test's second prong, which inquires 
into the perceptions or appearances that a law creates while conceding 
the possible constitutionality of a law that "in fact causes, even as a 
primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion."209 More funda-
mentally, the concern for symbolism is inherent in the very notion of 
"endorsement," and in the pervasive concern about "messages" rather 
than material consequences. Thus, even under the test's first prong, 
the question is not whether government intends to aid religion. Dis-
cussing the permissibility of aid would inevitably involve courts in a 
debate about what neutrality is; and that is a debate which the "no 
endorsement" test studiously shuns. Instead, the first prong asks 
whether government has intended to endorse religion - which may 
naturally be understood as a way of asking whether government has 
attempted to depart from an attitude, or appearance, of neutrality. 
In essence, Justice O'Connor's test imposes upon government the 
obligation to maintain an appearance of neutrality toward religion.210 
Government acts improperly both when it consciously seeks to violate 
that obligation and when, 'intentionally or not, it in fact acts in ways 
that do not seem neutral. Thus, maintaining the appearance of neu-
trality is the central concern in both the "intent" and "perception" 
prongs of O'Connor's test. 
V. SYMBOL OR ILLUSION? THE EMPTINESS OF NEUTRALITY AS 
AN EsTABLISHMENT IDEAL 
The "no endorsement" test brings to culmination two important 
themes in contemporary church-state analysis: the quest for neutral-
ity, and the jurisprudence of symbolism which supplements that quest 
and seeks to rescue it from the conundrum caused by the inability to 
articulate what neutrality actually means. Those themes represent 
powerful currents in contemporary thinking about the establishment 
208. "[T]he thrust of her analysis is the search for symbolic meaning." Marshall, supra note 
45, at 517. 
209. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
210. As discussed above, the justification offered by Justice O'Connor for her proposal docs 
not explicitly rest upon the ideal of neutrality; O'Connor has expressed reservations about 
whether the notion of neutrality can fully reconcile the perceived tensions between the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985). However, commenta-
tors favorable to O'Connor's approach have recognized that the appeal of the test lies in its 
attempt to implement the ideal of neutrality. See Braveman, supra note 16, at 385 ("the endorse-
ment test looks very similar to the neutrality principle"); Lacey, supra note 45, at 654 (linking 
proposed prohibition against "symbolic aid to religion" with assumption that "the Constitution 
requires neutrality towards religion"); Loewy, supra note 45, at 1049-51; Beschlc, supra note 45, 
at 174-75; Strossen, supra note 45, at 373 n.218. 
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clause; and by situating itself squarely in the middle of those currents, 
the "no endorsement" test has been carried forward by the stream. 
Where those currents will ultimately lead, however, is a question that 
deserves further consideration. 
A. The Failure of the Phenomenalistic Strategy 
The foregoing analysis has suggested that the jurisprudence of 
symbolism seeks to avoid the failures of earlier efforts to define the 
concept of neutrality by dropping the attempt to describe what gov-
ernmental neutrality toward religion is, and instead focusing upon 
whether government appears to be acting neutrally. This strategy par-
allels the sense-datum turn in theory of knowledge, which disowned 
the effort to obtain immediate knowledge of external objects as things 
in themselves, and instead adopted human perceptions, or sense data, 
as the proper objects of direct knowledge. However, the sense-datum 
theory has been powerfully criticized,211 and at least one of those criti-
cisms applies forcefully to the "no endorsement" strategy. 
Responding to the contention that sense-datum sentences such as 
"I see magenta now" are "incorrigible," or incapable of being falsified, 
the analytic philosopher J.L. Austin pointed out that such sentences 
may be false because the speaker may use words incorrectly. "I may 
say 'Magenta' wrongly," Austin observed, "either by a mere slip, hav-
ing meant to say 'Vermillion'; or because I don't know quite what 'ma-
genta' means, what shade of colour is called magenta .... "212 With 
respect to sense-datum statements such as "I see magenta," the kind of 
error identified by Austin may seem to be technically possible but eas-
ily avoidable in practice; and Austin acknowledged as much. We can 
prevent such mistakes by being sure we know what "magenta" means 
before we use the word, and then by attending carefully to our 
perceptions. 
However, the problem identified by Austin becomes much more 
persistent when we make assertions that government appears, or does 
not appear, to be acting neutrally with respect to religion. As Austin's 
argument makes clear, even statements about how things "appear" 
presuppose that we understand the meaning of the words we are using. 
At most, therefore, statements about appearances might permit us to 
avoid determining whether our perceptions correspond to some exter-
211. See generally w. SELLARS, SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND REALITY 127-96 (1963); J.L. 
AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA (1962); G. RYLE, THE CONCEPT Of MIND 210-22 (1949). 
212. J.L. AUSTIN, supra note 211, at 113 (emphasis added). Although he disagreed with 
Austin over the significance of such errors, Ayer conceded the possibility of "verbal errors" even 
in sense-datum statements. A.J. A YER, supra note 198, at 81-84. 
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nal reality; such statements do nothing to eliminate confusion that in-
heres in the words or concepts we use. As noted earlier, however, 
efforts to define what the concept of neutrality means in practice have 
been notoriously unsuccessful.213 But if we are not sure what neutral-
ity means, then we cannot confidently make statements about whether 
government appears to be acting neutrally. So long as we are not sure 
what a position of neutrality is, in other words, we cannot say whether 
government appears to be adhering to such a position. Indeed, so long 
as the concept of neutrality remains fuzzy and ambiguous, we cannot 
be sure when we use the word that we are really even communicating, 
or that we are talking coherently at all. 
Consider once again the Everson problem: Does the state act neu-
trally when it pays to bus children to parochial school? Some of the 
Justices argued that the policy was not neutral because it involved gov-
ernment in religion, gave assistance to religion, and facilitated reli-
gious activities. Other Justices argued that the state's policy was 
neutral because it merely put religious school students on an equal 
footing with public school students, whose transportation costs were 
also paid by the state.214 These positions obviously reflected differing 
conceptions of neutrality. The critical issue at this point is whether 
such disagreements might be reconciled, or at least avoided, by aban-
doning the question of whether the state's policy is neutral and instead 
asking whether the policy appears to be neutral. And the obvious an-
swer is that amending the question to ask about appearances does not 
even touch the problem; the disagreement over what neutrality means 
remains as lively as ever. If neutrality means noninvolvement, or "no 
aid," then the state policy both is and appears to be a violation of 
neutrality. Conversely, if neutrality means giving religious school chil-
dren the same assistance that public school children receive, then the 
policy is and appears to be neutral. The meaning of neutrality remains 
unclear; what is clear is that asking about symbolic rather than actual 
neutrality does not advance the discussion at all.2 1s 
Professor Marshall acknowledges this difficulty, though in other 
terms, when he asserts that "in a pluralistic culture, there is often no 
shared consensus of symbolic meaning," and that "how endorsement 
is perceived depends largely upon one's initial outlook."216 Nor does 
213. See notes 184-93 supra and accompanying text. 
214. See notes 185-86 supra and accompanying text. 
215. Altering doctrine so as to emphasize perceptions or appearances might be helpful ir 
people generally agreed about what the state may properly do but frequently disagreed about 
what the state is in fact doing. As Everson illustrates, however, that is not the nature of most 
establishment controversies. 
216. Marshall, supra note 45, at 533-34. 
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he try to wish this problem away, as Justice O'Connor does, by hy-
pothesizing an "objective observer" in whom divergent perspectives 
will inexplicably be reconciled or submerged. Indeed, he effectively 
criticizes the attempts of both Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan 
to resolve the problem.211 
But Marshall offers no other persuasive solution to the problem of 
divergent perspectives. He suggests that "if the Court can agree upon 
the appropriate initial perspective to employ in establishment cases, 
the range of individualized interpretations will be profoundly lim-
ited. "218 But this suggestion is not helpful. Of course establishment 
problems would be less intractable if we could identify the appropriate 
initial perspective, or conception of neutrality, from which to ap-
proach those problems. But that is precisely the difficulty: Because 
perspectives are in fact incurably diverse, a policy against creating per-
ceptions that government has endorsed or disapproved of religion can 
provide no grounds for identifying one perspective, or one conception 
of neutrality, as correct. 
To be sure, the Court could prescribe an "ardent separationist" 
perspective with respect to public schools, an "accommodationist" 
perspective for reviewing governmental practices and regulations, and 
a perspective of "qualified neutrality" for considering aid to parochial 
education, as Marshall recommends.219 But why should the Court 
embrace those perspectives? One answer might assert that the per-
spectives Marshall prescribes are appropriate because they are the per-
spectives that most people in fact assume in such contexts. But this is 
not Marshall's answer. He recognizes that the broad diversity of per-
spectives in a pluralistic culture makes consensus on appropriate per-
spectives unlikely,220 and that even if most people did agree upon 
particular perspectives, the majority view would not have any good 
claim to control.221 
Because Marshall cannot argue that his favored perspectives repre-
sent any de facto consensus, he is forced to contend that adopting such 
perspectives would lead to sound results as measured by criteria other 
than actual perceptions of endorsement. Thus, Marshall emphasizes 
that adoption of the prescribed perspectives would maintain continuity 
217. Id. at 535-37. 
218. Id. at 538. 
219. Id. at 541, 545, 548. Of course, whether the conception of "qualified neutrality" is any 
more helpful than other conceptions of neutrality that the Court and commentators have advo-
cated is questionable. 
220. Id. at 533-34. 
221. Id. at 535. 
324 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:266 
with past decisions.222 He also refers to other policies, such as recog-
nizing our cultural heritage, and avoiding church-state entangle-
ment. 223 Such policies are hardly new, of course, and they have not in 
the past led to coherent doctrine or consistent decisions. But the more 
important point is that these justifications for Marshall's prescribed 
perspectives have little to do with the supposed significance of percep-
tions, symbolism, and endorsement. Symbolism and perceptions, 
rather, turn out to be simply inconclusive, while other policies such as 
stare decisis in fact become dispositive. 
Admittedly, Marshall attempts to link some of these independent 
policies back to a concern about actual endorsement; but the attempt 
is unpersuasive. He suggests, for instance, that government practices 
consistent with our "cultural heritage" should be permitted, and tries 
to square this conclusion with the proposed prohibition on endorse-
ment by suggesting that, if a public practice is part of our cultural 
heritage, it will not be perceived as an improper endorsement of reli-
gion. Thus, "an adjustment for 'cultural heritage' " can be "built into 
the establishment equation [as] ... a part of the relevant frame of 
reference from which endorsement or non-endorsement would be per-
ceived. "224 But if this argument is supposed to relate cultural heritage 
to actual perceptions of endorsement, then the argument rests upon a 
false dichotomy. There is no reason to suppose that a particular prac-
tice or message touching upon religion must either reflect our cultural 
heritage or endorse religion; it may do both. 225 Indeed, since our cul-
tural heritage surely includes religious traditions, including the tradi-
tion of governmental endorsement of religion,226 many practices 
undoubtedly will do both. Marshall's argument that actions consistent 
with cultural heritage will not be seen as endorsements leads to a para-
doxical conclusion: In a strongly religious culture in which pervasive 
and overt governmental support for religion is taken for granted, gov-
ernment will never endorse religion. Conversely, the less religious gov-
ernment and culture become, the more likely it is that government will 
violate the establishment clause by endorsing religion.227 
222. Id. at 539-41. 
223. Id. at 542, 546. 
224. Id. at 532. 
225. Marshall here duplicates Justice O'Connor's error of treating "accommodation" and 
"endorsement" as creating a dichotomy, rather than as concepts that in practice will usually 
overlap. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text. 
226. See notes 139-42 supra and accompanying text. 
227. Nor can Marshall save the point by suggesting that actions consistent with our cultural 
heritage will be seen as endorsements but not as "improperly endorsing religion." Marshall, 
supra note 45, at 532 (emphasis added). In the first place, such actions will be seen by many as 
improper, as the reaction to Lynch demonstrates. Moreover, if the establishment clause does not 
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In sum, Marshall's argument begins by asserting that the Supreme 
Court should invalidate laws that create perceptions of endorsement. 
Marshall then concedes that perceptions of endorsement depend upon 
perspectives, which in a pluralistic culture may vary considerably 
from person to person. Thus, the criterion of perceptions, or symbolic 
impact, will rarely indicate whether a law or practice is constitutional; 
instead, that criterion will point both ways in nearly every case. Mar-
shall's argument then pretends to resolve the impasse by recom-
mending particular perspectives for particular problems, not because 
these perspectives describe what people will actually perceive - in 
each case, some people will perceive endorsement, and some won't -
but because the perspectives will generate results consistent with other 
sound policies, such as stare decisis and maintenance of our cultural 
heritage. But then why not just identify and adopt such other sound 
policies in the first place? Despite all the discussion of symbolism and 
perceptions, those factors ultimately seem to be little more than a 
fagade for decisions actually to be made on other grounds ushered in 
through the back door.22s 
Thus, the neutrality attained through symbolism turns out to be 
illusory. We cannot achieve the appearance of neutrality unless we 
first know what actual neutrality means. But if we knew what actual 
neutrality meant, why would we be content with a merely symbolic 
neutrality? 
B. Neutrality as a Parasitic Concept 
The problems both with the "no endorsement" test and with the 
jurisprudence of symbolism can be traced to a common cause: the con-
cept of neutrality. That concept, paradoxically, appears to be both 
irresistible and yet so indeterminate as to be almost meaningless. But 
how can an idea be at once indispensable and useless? 
forbid "endorsement," but only "improper" endorsement, then the basic question which Mar-
shall purports to answer once again becomes wide open: What, under the establishment clause, 
may government "properly" do? 
228. Unlike Marshall, Professor Johnson does not prescribe particular perspectives for as-
sessing the appearances or perceptions created by government policies. He implies, rather, that 
all perspectives should be taken into account, and suggests that government can appear neutral 
by siding sometimes with one position and sometimes with an opposing position, thereby avoid-
ing the appearance of any uniform or systematic favoritism. Johnson, supra note 112, at 839-41. 
Johnson argues that current doctrine, despite its analytical deficiencies, may serve satisfactorily if 
applied in a spirit of fairness and compromise. Id. at 839-40, 845-46. More recently, Marshall 
likewise appears to have moved toward such a position favoring symbolic neutrality in the aggre-
gate. Marshall, Unprecedemial Analysis and Original Intent, 27 WM.&. MARYL. REV. 925, 929 
(1986). The hope is that such an approach will make everyone at least partly happy. The current 
state of consternation over Lemon, however, see notes 9-19 supra and accompanying text, at least 
suggests the possibility that such an approach will in fact leave everyone deeply unhappy. 
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1. An Analogy - Neutrality and the Judge 
In an effort to dissolve that paradox, it is helpful to begin by ex-
ploring what neutrality means in a context where it is somewhat more 
familiar. In deciding cases, judges are expected to be neutral; judicial 
neutrality might therefore serve as a useful analogue to the neutrality 
one might ask of the state generally in matters of religion.229 Suppose 
that a newly appointed judge must decide a contract case between a 
prosperous merchant and a cancer-affiicted widow. Although the 
judge knows very little about the case at this point, she is well ac-
quainted with her own predispositions; she knows that she is generally 
sympathetic to widows and to cancer victims, and that she has no 
great fondness for merchants. She does not apologize for these predis-
positions, but believes she could articulate plausible reasons for hold-
ing them. At the same time, the judge believes she is obligated to act 
neutrally, both in the way she conducts the proceedings and in the 
way she ultimately decides the case. She therefore asks us, her law 
clerks or advisers, to explain, first, what neutrality means and, second, 
how the idea of neutrality should guide her in conducting and deciding 
the case. 
In answering the first question, we might begin by suggesting that 
neutrality means the judge should not favor or aid either party to the 
dispute. This "no favoritism" version of neutrality is probably correct 
in some sense. But it may also be badly misleading. During the 
course of the proceedings, the judge will be asked to rule on numerous 
motions regarding discovery, the conduct of the trial, the admissibility 
of evidence, jury instructions, and other matters. In granting or deny-
ing such motions, the judge will inevitably rule "in favor of," and will 
thereby give assistance to, one party or the other. Similarly, at the 
conclusion of the case the judge will be expected to enter a judgment 
"in favor of" one of the parties. Taken too literally, a version of neu-
trality which forbids "favoring" either party might prevent the judge 
from performing these essential tasks. 
If the judge were to raise this concern, we would of course assure 
her that our admonition against favoring either party does not mean 
she cannot rule in their favor on motions or in her final judgment. But 
then what exactly does the admonition mean? The "no favoritism" 
229. Cf Beschle, supra note 45, at 174 (comparing establishment neutrality to that required 
of a "judge or an umpire"). Of course, since conceptions of neutrality differ, the analogy will not 
be equally pertinent to every conception, and some conceptions might therefore be immune to 
the analysis which follows. I would suggest, however, that exploring the analogy to judicial 
neutrality helps to identify a core sense of neutrality which underlies the appeal the concept has 
exhibited. 
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version of neutrality obviously must be qualified to mean only that 
some kinds of favoring are forbidden. But the qualified version simply 
reformulates the original question: What kinds of favoring does neu-
trality forbid? 
A related response might seek to answer this question by proposing 
that neutrality means equal treatment. Thus, the judge, in ruling upon 
motions and in deciding the case, may favor or aid the parties so long 
as she treats them equally. But this explanation, like the previous one, 
is acceptable only if understood in some qualified sense that the expla-
nation itself fails to articulate. Taken literally, the "equal treatment" 
version of neutrality might lead to absurd results. If the judge grants 
ten evidentiary objections made by the widow, can the merchant plau-
sibly argue that equal treatment requires the judge to grant ten of his 
evidentiary objections? And what would it mean for the final judg-
ment to treat the parties equally? Must each party receive half of the 
relief that he or she is seeking? 
The "no favoritism" and "equal treatment" proposals thus force us 
to consider the further questions: What kinds of "favoring" does neu.: 
trality forbid? In what sense should a judge treat the parties equally? 
Those questions may lead to the following answer. The bodies of law 
known as civil procedure and evidence prescribe rules or criteria that 
the judge should look to in conducting a case and in admitting or ex-
cluding evidence. Likewise, the law of contracts contains rules or crite-
ria that should guide the judge in deciding whether a valid and 
enforceable contract exists. Neutrality means that in conducting the 
proceeding, and ultimately in deciding the case, the judge should act 
only upon the basis of proper rules or criteria, rather than upon other 
factors that the law regards as extraneous or improper. There are, in 
other words, factors that the law deems to be proper bases for a deci-
sion, and other factors that are not considered by the law to be ger-
mane. So long as the judge bases her decisions upon proper 
considerations, she can be said to be acting neutrally.230 
This explanation of neutrality gives content and scope to the in-
complete and potentially misleading definitions considered earlier. 
Strictly speaking, the assertion that the judge must not favor od1ssist 
widows is simply not true. The widow may prevail on the merits, and 
230. Often, of course, the propriety of considering particular factors may be debatable. If the 
judge consults a particular factor which she considers properly relevant, critics of the decision 
may argue that she acted incorrectly because the factor should not be relevant. Charges that the 
judge did not act "neutrally," by contrast, are most likely to be made in cases in which the judge 
is believed to have been influenced by factors that everyone, including the judge herself, would 
agree to be improper, such as personal sympathy or aversion to one of the parties, or a personal 
stake in the outcome. 
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the judge must then issue a judgment in her favor - a judgment that 
may provide substantial assistance to her. The "no favoritism" ver-
sion of neutrality is acceptable, however, if it is understood to mean 
that the judge must not favor or assist either party except in accord-
ance with proper criteria. Similarly, the judge treats the parties equally 
if she favors or disfavors them only upon the basis of proper criteria. 
Thus, she may treat the merchant ·equally even though she denies 
every one of his motions and issues judgment against him, so long as 
those decisions are based upon the criteria prescribed by the law.231 
It seems most helpful, in sum, to understand neutrality not as "no 
favoritism" or equal treatment - although those definitions, properly 
qualified, may be correct - but rather as adherence to accepted or 
proper criteria of decision. Having offered that response to the judge's 
first question, we must now consider her second question: How does 
the concept of neutrality guide the judge in conducting the proceed-
ings and deciding the case? And the unhappy answer seems to be that 
the concept is of no help at all. If the judge knows what the proper 
rules or criteria for decision are, the neutrality norm tells her that she 
should act on the basis of those rules or criteria. But that counsel is 
superfluous; if the judge already knows that such criteria are the 
proper bases for her decision, we add nothing to her knowledge by 
telling her she should act upon such criteria. On the other hand, if the 
judge does not already know what the proper criteria for decision are, 
telling her to be neutral will leave her as much in the dark as ever 
about how to conduct and decide the case. 
It might seem that neutrality at least cancels out the judge's initial 
predispositions or prejudices by telling her that she must not decide 
the case for the widow because she is a widow, or against the merchant 
because he is a merchant. But even those prohibitions cannot be de-
duced from the concept of neutrality. Rather, they derive from the 
fact that widowhood and merchanthood are not included among the 
substantive criteria that the law deems proper bases for a decision. To 
the extent that the law does make a party's merchant status rele-
vant, 232 the merchant cannot complain if that status influences the 
judge, just as he could not complain, when the evidence shows he de-
231.~ The same point can be made about the neutrality expected of an umpire or referee in an 
athletic contest. The umpire is expected to enforce the rules in an evenhanded fashion. So long 
as the judge acts consistently in accordance with the rules, he can be said to have treated each 
side fairly and equally, even if most of the infractions happen to be committed by and called 
against one of the sides. 
232. For instance, decisions in cases under the Uniform Commercial Code may properly turn 
on whether the seller of goods is a .. merchant." See I W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAi 
GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE JO, 70, 238 (1964). 
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frauded the widow, that the judge violated neutrality by deciding the 
case against him just because he was a defrauder. The concept of neu-
trality, in short, provides no independent guidance to the judge, but 
merely reaffirms the substantive law upon which it is parasitic. 
Although the concept of neutrality provides little practical assist-
ance to the judge in deciding a case, however, it hardly follows that the 
concept is inapplicable to the judge, or that it deserves to be repudi-
ated. On the contrary, the assertion that the judge should be neutral is 
still perfectly, and indeed tautologically, true. Conversely, it would be 
perverse and even self-contradictory to suggest that the judge need not 
act neutrally; the suggestion would amount to asserting, illogically, 
that a judge may properly base a decision upon improper criteria. 
Neutrality, in short, remains an essential judicial virtue. Moreover, 
the concept has value in discourse about judging; when we believe that 
a judge has acted upon a criterion that is generally regarded as an 
impermissible basis for decision, such as personal sympathy or aver-
sion, we can intelligibly express that criticism by saying that the judge 
has violated the obligation of neutrality. What the concept cannot do, 
however, is supply the substantive rules or criteria which guide judi-
cial decisionmaking. 
2. The Analogy Applied - Neutrality and Religion 
Applied to the problem of church-state relations, this analysis of 
neutrality helps to explain why the concept is so irresistible and yet so 
apparently barren, and even productive of confusion. Just. as neutral-
ity forbids the judge to "favor" either party to a dispute, neutrality 
precludes the state from "favoring" either religion or nonreligion. 233 
As with judicial neutrality, however, that explanation is not especially 
helpful. Government inevitably must act in myriad ways that help or 
hinder religious or nonreligious interests. Laws often reinforce aspects 
of morality favored by some religions234 but burden other religious 
practices. Public education equips children to read scriptures; it may 
also contradict, displace, or weaken particular religious beliefs. Fire 
departments put out fires in churches - and in nightclubs and casi-
nos. Roads maintained by the state facilitate travel to church services 
- and to recreation that draws people away from church services. Of 
233. Cf Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (neutral-
ity means "no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion" (quoting Abington 
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring))). 
234. See Zimmerman, To Walk a Crooked Path: Separating Law and Religion in the Secular 
State, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1095, 1096 (1986) ("[M]any criminal laws, as well as many laws 
governing family relations or touching on other moral concerns, are congruent with and often 
derived from the insights of the J udeo-Christian faiths."). 
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course, many public measures do not deliberately seek to help or hin-
der religion (although they in fact help or hinder religion nonetheless); 
but some do. Governments grant conscientious objector status, or re-
quire employers to accommodate their employees' religious concerns. 
Thus, in one sense, government constantly and inevitably both fa-
vors and disfavors - and assists and inhibits - religion. Even as we 
insist that government must not aid or favor religion, we instinctively 
sense that the extension of police and fire protection to churches does 
not fall within the prohibition. But why not? The problem with the 
"no favoritism" version of neutrality is that it is too gross; in its appar-
ent absoluteness it gives no guidance as to what kinds of favoring are 
permissible and what kinds are not. Moreover, this account of neu-
trality is not only misleading but dangerous, since there is no assur-
ance that someone, including a judge, might not take it at face value. 
The consequence of that course can only be confusion. 
Likewise, neutrality means that government must in some sense 
extend equal treatment to differing religions, as well as to religion and 
nonreligion. 235 But that admonition surely cannot mean that govern-
ment must somehow equalize the public benefits and burdens con-
ferred and imposed upon religion and nonreligion. Such a 
requirement is not merely impracticable; it is unintelligible. How 
would we know what to count as religious and nonreligious interests, 
and how would we aggregate and compare the benefits received and 
the burdens incurred by each? If government decides to subsidize 
farmers, must it equally subsidize clergy? (In total dollars? In propor-
tion to their respective numbers? Their respective needs?) If money is 
allocated to enhancing the nation's war-making capacity, must match-
ing funds be set aside to support the promulgation of the Gospel? A 
plausible account of establishment neutrality cannot require us to ask, 
much less answer, such questions. 
A more adequate statement of neutrality would assert that neutral-
ity requires government, like the judge, to act in matters that affect 
religion only upon proper criteria. So long as it acts upon proper crite-
ria, government can be regarded as avoiding improper favoritism and 
as treating religion and nonreligion equally. But this proposition, 
though it explains neutrality, does not tell us what government can 
and cannot do; it leaves unanswered the critical question of what the 
proper criteria are. And with respect to that question, neutrality sim-
235. Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (applying equal protection strict scrutiny as 
part of establishment analysis). 
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ply has nothing to say. Neutrality is parasitic upon -- not the parent 
of - substantive doctrine. 
This assessment illuminates the underlying problem with an estab-
lishment jurisprudence dedicated to the ideal of neutrality. The prob-
lem is not that the ideal is inapposite or incorrect; the ideal is, on the 
contrary, essential. The error is in expecting from neutrality more 
than it can deliver. Scholars and judges ought to pay due respect to 
the ideal of neutrality - and then recognize that all the hard analyti-
cal, interpretive, or historical work remains to be done. If they insist 
that the ideal of neutrality do that work for them, the inevitable conse-
quence will be confusion. 
CONCLUSION: BEYOND SYMBOLISM AND NEUTRALITY 
Blood, it is said, cannot be squeezed out of a stone; but the prov-
erb's continuing active circulation suggests that people persist in try-
ing. Substantive establishment doctrine, similarly, cannot be deduced 
from the ideal of neutrality. The ideal is valid but parasitic; it is de-
pendent upon - rather than generative of - substantive criteria or 
rules for regulating church-state relations. But neither scholars nor 
judges seem ready to give up the attempt - hence the appeal, and the 
futility, of Justice O'Connor's "no endorsement" test. By focusing 
upon a law's symbolic effects and the perceptions it creates, the test 
seems to derive guidance from the ideal of neutrality while avoiding 
the conundrums that have plagued efforts to give substantive content 
to that ideal. But the appearance is an illusion - and one which dis-
appears when the test is critically examined. Such an examination 
reveals that the "no endorsement" test is riddled with analytical flaws 
that can only compound the confusion and inconsistency afflicting 
current establishment doctrine. 
Thus, adoption of the "no endorsement" test would simply initiate 
another era of chaotic results - and ensuing accusations of disingenu-
ousness and doctrinal manipulation. While establishment doctrine un-
doubtedly needs reexamination, the "no endorsement" test is not the 
solution. The test's deficiencies should rather prompt scholars and ju-
rists to explore other doctrinal alternatives,236 unencumbered by the 
illusion that substantive answers can be deduced from the formal idea 
236. For instance, efforts to develop a doctrine devoted to preventing governmental coercion 
of religious belief and practice, see, e.g., McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Elemellf of Estab/ish-
mellf, 27 WM. & MARYL. REV. 933 (1986); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Ame11d-
me11t: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PIIT. L. REV. 673 (1980), seem much more promising than 
attempts to resolve church-state problems by reference to the formal concept of neutrality. 
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of neutrality, or that doctrinal problems can be avoided by retreating 
into symbolism and appearances. 
